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AN ARGUMENT AGAINST UNBOUNDED ARREST
POWER: THE EXPRESSIVE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND PROTESTING WHILE BLACK
Karen J. PitaLoor*
Protestingis supposed to be revered in our democracy, considered "as American as apple pie" in our nation's mythology. But the actual experiences of the
2020 racialjustice protestersshowed that this supposed reverencefor political
dissent and protest is more akin to American folklore than reality on the
streets. The imagesfrom those streets depictedpolice officers clad in riot gear
and armed with shields, batons, and "less than" lethal weapons aggressively
arrestingprotesters, often en masse. In the first week of the George Floydprotests, police arrested roughly 10,000 people, and approximately 78 percent of
those arrests were for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses or criminal violations.
Moreover, troublingfigures regardingthe racial breakdown of protest-related
arrests, along with anecdotes from activists, suggest that just as with routine
policing, the experiences ofBlack and white people differ duringprotests-even
when they protestside by side-with policepotentially targetingBlack activists
for arrest. This Article exposes how police officers' easy access to a wide arsenal
of criminal chargesserves to trampleon expressivefreedoms and explains how
a new and clearer understandingof the Fourth Amendment's application to
expressive conduct should curb the police's seemingly unboundedpower to arrest protesters. In PartI of this Article, I revisit and review the roots and rationale of the Expressive Fourth Amendment doctrine, which posits that there
is an expressive component to FourthAmendment protection.In PartII, I discuss the criminal statutes thatpolice often use to make arrests duringprotests
and then focus more narrowly on the arrests in New York City in the early
days of the George Floyd demonstrations, including the racial makeup of arrestees. In PartIII, I explain how the presidingunderstandingof the Fourth
Amendment places minimal limits on a police officer's ability to arrest, regardless of an individual'sengagement in expressive political conduct. Thereafter,
I describe how the Expressive FourthAmendment should apply to arrests and
serve to curtail an officer's ability to engage in warrantlessarrests of protesters
for nonviolent misdemeanors.
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INTRODUCTION

Protesting is supposed to be revered in our democracy, considered "as
American as apple pie" in our nation's mythology. But the actual experiences
of the 2020 racial justice protesters showed that this supposed reverence for
political dissent and protest is more akin to American folklore than reality on

the streets. The images from those streets depicted police officers clad in riot
gear and armed with shields, batons, and "less than" lethal weapons aggres-

sively arresting protesters, often en masse. In the first week of the George Floyd
protests, police arrested roughly 10,000 people,' and approximately 78 percent of those arrests were for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses or criminal
violations.2 Moreover, troubling figures regarding the racial breakdown of
protest-related arrests, 3 along with anecdotes from activists, suggest that just

1.
See Anita Snow, AP Tally: Arrests at Widespread U.S. Protests Hit 10,000, AP NEWS
(June 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/american-protests-us-news-arrests-minnesota-bur-

glary-bb2404f9b13c8b53b94c73f818f6a0b7

[perma.cc/XN6Z-LB9K]. Within two weeks, the

number of arrests reached 17,000. Meryl Kornfield et al., Swept Up by Police, WASH. POST
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/investigations/george-floyd
-protesters-arrests [perma.cc/MZ3L-MSBR].
2.
See Kornfield et al., supra note 1 (finding in a sample of 2,652 protestors from fifteen
cities that 2,059 were "accused of nonviolent misdemeanors, most on charges of violating curfew
or emergency orders").
3.
I define protest-related arrests here as those that occur when an arrestee is present at
a protest and appears to be part of the protest.
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like with routine policing, 4 the experiences of Black and whites people differ
during protests-even when they protest side by side-with police potentially
targeting Black activists for arrest. Like other activities, including driving

4.
See Colleen Walsh, Solving RacialDisparitiesin Policing, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 23,
2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/02/solving-racial-disparities-in-policing
[perma.cc/ZB8N-EVHD] ("According to historians and other scholars, [racialized policing] is
embedded in the story of the nation and its culture. Rooted in slavery, racial disparities in policing ... are sustained by systemic exclusion and discrimination, and fueled by implicit and explicit bias."); Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin Police Stops
Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 736 (2020) ("[B]lack drivers were less
likely to be stopped after sunset, when a 'veil of darkness' masks one's race, suggesting bias in
stop decisions."); see also Lenese C. Herbert, Can't You See What I'm Saying? Making Expressive
Conduct a Crime in High-CrimeAreas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 135, 153 (2002) (arguing that First Amendment expression is implicated during routine policing when suspected individuals flee police in so-called "high-crime areas" as flight is one of the most effective forms of
expression for those in minority communities because it allows them to "communicate their
distaste of the police and to exercise their choice to remove themselves from police presence
without compromising the safety of themselves or others-especially when the speakers perceive

disdain by society.").
5.
I have decided to capitalize "Black" and "Brown" but not "white" to reflect the shared
identity and history of repression among communities of color. See David Bauder, AP Says It Will
Capitalize Black but Not white, AP NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/entertainment-cultures-race-and-ethnicity-us-news-ap-top-news-7e36c00c5af0436abc09e051261 fff1f

[perma.cc/S5N6-7KTA]; see also Peter Wegner, Capitalize Brown, KQED (Aug. 12, 2020),
https://www.kqed.org/perspectives/201601140174/peter-wegnercapitalize-brown
[perma.cc/
VFX5-A926] ("Capital B for Black people. Capital B for Brown people. It's not a revolution, even
in the world of typography. It's incremental, a keystroke's worth of change. It costs nothing. It
is, literally, the least we can do."). I also use Latine in lieu of "Latinx," "Latino," or "Latina" because, as a native Spanish speaker, the "e" at the end of a word is more in line with the language
than "x" and already utilized in words that do not ascribe gender.
A growing number of LGBTQ communities [in the United States] and abroad use 'Latine'
(la-tee-neh). Not only does it sound much less awkward in Spanish than 'Latinx,' but the
-e can be applied to other words in verbal Spanish very easily, in lieu of the masculine -o
or the feminine -a.
See Jose A. Del Real, 'Latinx'Hasn'tEven Caught on Among Latinos. It Never Will, WASH. POST
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/latinx-latinos-unpopular-gender-

term/2020/12/18/bfl77c5c-3b41-1leb-9276-aeOca72729bestory.html [perma.cc/9YRL-UX74];
see also Laysha Macedo, Latinx, Latine, Hispanic, Latino/a: What Do We Call Ourselves?,
HIPLATINA (Oct. 13, 2021), https://hiplatina.com/latinx-latino-latina-terms [perma.cc/7NMF94H6] (discussing a low prevalence of the use of the word "Latinx" among Spanish-speaking
communities and the increase in "Latine" as a "gender neutral [option that] flows more in Spanish in [sic] than 'Latinx' ").

1584

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:1581

while Black,6 sitting in Starbucks while Black,7 jogging while black,8 and bird
watching while Black, 9 protestingwhile Black may also place Black people in

harm's way much more than white people. However, while the sight of Black
people engaged in these typical innocuous activities should not spur civilian
or police scrutiny or much less aggression, protesting is not just innocuous
but constitutionally protected expressive conduct. 10
This Article exposes how police officers' easy access to a wide arsenal of
criminal charges serves to trample on expressive freedoms and explains how
a new and clearer understanding of the Fourth Amendment's application to

expressive conduct should curb the police's seemingly unbounded power to
arrest protesters. I revisit the Expressive FourthAmendment doctrine, which I
previously advanced in another article, and where I posited that there is an
expressive component to Fourth Amendment protection." Courts have
largely ignored or missed this expressive realm of Fourth Amendment protection in most contexts and, therefore, have treated expressive conduct by protesters the same as nonexpressive conduct by criminal suspects. Like other
scholars,12 I maintain that current jurisprudence surrounding arrests of indi-

6.
David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation's Highways,
ACLU (June 1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways [perma.cc/EWL2-ZCFQ] ("[P]olice ostensibly looking for drug criminals routinely stop drivers based on the color of their skin. This practice is so common that the minority
community has given it the derisive term, 'driving while [B]lack or [B]rown'-a play on the real
offense of 'driving while intoxicated.' "); see also Driving While Black: A Curated Collection of
Links, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 22, 2022, 9:25 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/rec-

ords/1819-driving-while-black [perma.cc/8F2Q-RB67].
7.
Damien Gayle, Arrest of Two Black Men at Starbucks for 'Trespassing'Sparks Protests,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2018, 8:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/16/arrestof-two-black-men-at-starbucks-for-trespassing-sparks-protests [perma.cc/VM9S-CKLG].
8.
Kurt Streeter, Running While Black: Our Readers Respond, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/sports/running-while-black-ahmaud-arbery.html [perma.

cc/J4XV-XCZS].
9.
Joan Walsh, Birding While Black: Just the Latest Bad Reasonfor White People to Call
Police, NATION (May 26, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/amy-cooper-birding-

police [perma.cc/4CRT-LXKU].
10.
The Supreme Court recognizes that conduct "expressing certain views is the type of
symbolic act" that is "closely akin to 'pure speech' which ... is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 505-06 (1969). Thus, I include not only pure speech but other expressive activity-waving,
clapping, chanting, marching-in my expressive conduct definition.
11.
Karen J. Pita Loor, The Expressive Fourth Amendment, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (2021)
[hereinafter Loor, Expressive Fourth];Karen J. Pita Loor, "Hey! Hey! Ho, Ho! These Mass Arrests
Have Got to Go!": The Expressive Fourth Amendment Argument, 28 WM. & MARY J. RACE,
GENDER & SOC. JUST. 5 (2021) [hereinafter Loor, Mass Arrests].

12. See Aya Gruber, Policingand "Bluelining," 58 HOUS. L. REV. 867, 902 (2021) ("The
law encourages brutality in these policed spaces by conferring on officers near absolute power
to physically dominate the individuals-Black or [w]hite-they encounter on the street.... [as]
courts consider only whether the officer acted reasonably (had reasonable fear) in the 'split-second' moment when he pulled the trigger."); John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The
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viduals suspected of nonexpressive illegal conduct provides insufficient protection to be faithful to the Fourth Amendment. However, I contribute here,
like in my prior articles, a distinct critique by contending that when the conduct is expressive, courts must provide special protection. Like my prior
pieces,13 this Article fills this gap in Fourth Amendment understanding. Thus,
when an individual is engaged in expressive conduct, the Expressive Fourth
Amendment mandates that courts review any government intrusion with

"scrupulous exactitude," 14 asking whether a police officer behaved reasonably
"in the light of the values of freedom of expression."1 5 The Expressive Fourth
Amendment will protect all activists, but naturally, it should particularly ben-

efit those who are the most frequent victims of capricious police arrest power.
In Part I of this Article, I review the Expressive Fourth Amendment, including its roots and rationale. In Part II, I discuss the criminal statutes that
police often use to make arrests during protests and then focus more narrowly
on the arrests in New York City in the early days of the George Floyd demonstrations, including the racial makeup of arrestees. In Part III, I explain how
the general understanding of the Fourth Amendment places minimal limits

on a police officer's ability to arrest, regardless of an individual's engagement
in expressive political conduct. Thereafter, I describe how the Expressive
Fourth Amendment should apply to arrests and serve to curtail an officer's
ability to engage in warrantless arrests of protesters for nonviolent misdemeanors.
I.

REVIEWING THE EXPRESSIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Courts should afford protesters enhanced protection in their interactions
with police officers in the streets. Putting aside, for purposes of this argument,
well-founded objections to courts' deference to law enforcement during routine police encounters, 16 police officers should not be permitted to treat protesters engaged in expressive political conduct like they treat other individuals
whom they suspect of criminal conduct but are not involved in protests.
Fourth Amendment protections have an expressive component that jurists
have completely missed in protest situations." In this Article, I define protest
as a public expression of political dissent or opposition. In my prior article, I
Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 155, 161 (2016) (arguing
that the Supreme Court's deference to law enforcement is based on inaccurate assumptions regarding the reasonableness of their actions); Gregory Howard Williams, Controlling the Use of
Non-Deadly Force: Policy and Practice, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 79, 95 (1993) ("[T]he basic
problem with Graham is the fantasy of the Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' test and the socalled balancing analysis. 'Reasonableness' is never truly defined, and unfortunately the balance
rarely weighs in favor of the citizen.").
13.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11; Loor, Mass Arrests, supra note 11.

14.
15.

Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973).

16.

See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 12, at 902-07.

17.
For a full and detailed explication of the doctrine and its foundations, see Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11.
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introduced the Expressive Fourth Amendment in the context of claims of police excessive force and argued that to provide appropriate protection to persons engaged in protest, the analysis should shift from whether the
government actor's conduct is reasonable to whether it is reasonable in light
of freedom of expression.18 In the context of excessive force cases, this means
that courts should positively weigh activists' expressive conduct in their reasonableness calculus. 19 This rebalancing should result in courts providing less
leeway for police officers to use force against protesters than courts provide in
cases involving ordinary crimes and nonexpressive disturbances. Here, in this
Article, I argue that the Expressive Fourth Amendment also limits how police
officers may utilize their arrest power against protesters on the streets, specifically limiting their ability to make warrantless arrests for nonviolent misdemeanors. 20

I previously supported the contention that the Fourth Amendment is
meant to protect freedom of expression in two ways: First, I harkened to the
history of the English Crown's abusive use of its search and seizure power to
suppress political nonconformists and showed that history was fresh in the
Framers' minds when drafting the Fourth Amendment. 21 Second, I demon-

strated that the Supreme Court recognized the difference that historical foundations make in cases dealing with searches for expressive materials, such as
books, pamphlets, films, and other publications-namely the "papers" cases. 22
The lessons from a British controversy between the king and the press
guided the Framers as they conceived the Fourth Amendment's limitations on
the American government's power of search and seizure.23 In 1763, after the
anonymous publication of a critique of the king in an antigovernment English

newspaper, prosecutors charged the unknown critics with seditious libel and
obtained a warrant directing government officials to locate those connected

18.
19.

See id. at Section II.B.
See id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (setting forth the

balancing test for Fourth Amendment excessive force violations).
20.
See infra Part III. At this time, I leave open the question of how the Expressive Fourth
Amendment should apply to arrests for felonies.
21.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11, at Section III.A.1.

22. See id. at Section III.A.2 (discussing New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873
(1986); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504
(1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 511 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729
(1961)).
23.
See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING 602-1791, at 440 (2009).
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to the libelous publication and arrest them.24 The warrant did not provide direction regarding where to search or whom to apprehend. 25 Indeed, "[f]ollowing precedent, the warrant specified nothing beyond the [newspaper] printer's
name; its bearers were free to search, seize, and arrest as their whims dictated." 2 6 Armed with this expansive warrant, the king's messengers embarked

on a spree, ransacking multiple homes and offices, collecting voluminous papers, and arresting any individual they suspected of being related to the newspaper, including their family members and employees.27 Victims of these
searches brought lawsuits against those involved in the warrant's issuance and
execution, arguing against the English Crown's broad power to engage in abusive searches and arrests of political dissidents. 28 The controversy and the ensuing lawsuits captured the attention of both the American colonies and the
British and engendered a disdain in both for oppressive government searches
that persisted in the new nation's psyche and influenced the Bill of Rights'
drafters.29

In a series of cases regarding searches for expressive materials, the Supreme Court explains how this history motivated Fourth Amendment protections.30 Unlike searches for contraband or other nonexpressive items, the
Court reviews searches for expressive materials with "scrupulous exactitude,"" providing little deference to individual police officers' judgments of
what items should be seized out of concern that in their zeal to enforce the
law, officers may unwittingly sweep up protected First Amendment papers. 2
Applying this reasoning from the papers cases, just like with searches of expressive materials, when the policed person is engaged in expressive protest
activity, courts should ask what is reasonable "in the light of the values of freedom of expression"" and then review a police officer's conduct with scrupulous exactitude.34

24.
Id. at 440-41. Seditious libel is "[a] communication written with the intent to incite
the people to change the government otherwise than by lawful means, or to advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence." Seditious Libel, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th

ed. 1990).
25. CUDDIHY, supra note 23, at 440-41.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 441.
28. Id. at 443.
29. See id. at 439-40.
30. See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873 (1986); Maryland v. Macon, 472
U.S. 463, 468 (1985); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978); Roaden v. Kentucky,
413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,483-85 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).
31. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485.
32.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11, at Section III.A.2.

33. Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504 (finding seizure of an allegedly obscene film to be an unreasonable restraint on Fourth Amendment safeguards absent a warrant).
34.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11, at 1349 (discussing Stanford v. Texas, 379

U.S. 476 (1965)).
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Shifting courts' inquiry to evaluating reasonableness in light of freedom
of expression has consequences not only for police officers' use of force during
protests35 but also for how police officers exercise their arrest power during
protests-including their ability to make warrantless arrests and engage in
pretextual arrests.3 6 Concerns over how deference to individual officers

searching through expressive materials endangers freedom of expression are
present when officers police and arrest protest participants. As Justice William
J. Brennan asserted in relation to one of the papers cases, "[t]he disruptive
potential [on the First Amendment] of an effectively unbounded power to arrest should be apparent."3 7

II.

ARRESTS DURING PROTESTS

Part II discusses the wide array of criminal statutes that enable police to
effectuate arrests during protests. I list, discuss, and categorize those criminal
offenses most frequently employed to arrest protesters. While the list is by no
means exhaustive, the expansive range of offenses demonstrates not only the
scope of law enforcement arrest power but also that such arrest power is not
curtailed during protest. I then turn to the protest-related arrests in New York
City during the first week of the George Floyd demonstrations and query
whether the racial breakdown of those arrests suggests disparate policing of
Black protesters.
A.

Legal Basisfor Arrest Powers DuringProtests

Currently, law enforcement officers' power to arrest activists (or anyone)
on the streets is largely unbounded. To begin, criminal law provides police
officers with a vast array of criminal statutes that they can easily access to arrest protesters. Under prevailing Fourth Amendment doctrine, courts do not
differentiate between an individual suspected of criminal conduct but primarily engaged in expressive activity during a protest and one suspected of criminal conduct outside the context of a protest when determining the
reasonableness of an arrest. 38 The bar is low for a police officer to effectuate a
warrantless arrest at the scene, whether the scenario is a protest or a criminal
investigation.

35.

See id. at Section II.B.

36.
In her article, Why Arrest?, Professor Rachel Harmon also argues for limiting the
power of police officers to make arrests, but not for constitutional reasons as I do, but for public
policy reasons. Specifically, she argues that the overwhelming costs of arrest to the arrestee, their
family, officer safety, and society outweigh the minimal benefits of arrest to commencing the
criminal process, stopping disorder, gathering evidence, and encouraging deterrence. Rachel A.

Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307 (2016).
37. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 474 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11, at 1314.
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Further, a law enforcement officer need not be convinced that the government can secure a conviction before effectuating an arrest in either a protest or nonprotest scenario but must only reasonably believe that a crime was
or is being committed. 9Since no warrant is required, an individual police officer's belief that probable cause exists suffices on the streets for purposes of
arrest. Even if there is a subsequent judicial ruling that there was no probable
cause to support the arrest, that does not prevent the police officer from initially making the arrest. Police can freely effectuate arrests for traditional

crimes, for crimes specifically designed to control what government classifies
as civil unrest, and for conduct that would not be criminal butfor the existence
of an emergency order proclaimed in response to protests.40 Thus, already
broad and discretionary traditional arrest power is even more expansive dur-

ing protests.4 1
1.

Application of Traditional Crimes to Protests

A review of arrests from the 2020 racial justice protests across jurisdictions reveals how the police readily and freely used traditional crimes to arrest
activists. I define traditional crimes as criminal statutes that the police utilize
during routine policing and that are not specifically designed to respond to
perceived civil unrest or emergencies. The traditional crimes discussed here
include disorderly conduct, obstruction of public ways, trespass, and burglary.
These crimes are weaponized against activists during protests in much the
same way that they are weaponized against individuals during traditional po-

licing; however, beyond an individual's right to bodily integrity present during
a routine criminal investigation, both the individual and public interests in

freedom of expression during protests mandate rebalancing of the courts' reasonableness analysis.42 It is vital to note that the majority of these crimes, with

39.

See infra Part II.

40.

See infra Section II.A.

41.
Although not the subject of this Article, elected officials and lawmakers in various
jurisdictions are seeking to further increase police officers' tools to control protests and enhance
penalties and collateral consequences against protesters for arrests via various anti-protest laws.
See US ProtestLaw Tracker, ICNL (last updated Apr. 25, 2022), https://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker [perma.cc/36KY-FK4W]. Since the 2020 racial justice protests, at least eighty-one of
these laws have been proposed. Reid J. Epstein & Patricia Mazzei, G.O.P. Bills Target Protesters
(andAbsolve Motorists Who Hit Them), N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/04/21/us/politics/republican-anti-protest-laws.html [perma.cc/6ARZ-XU9U]; see also
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Defining Nonviolence as a Matter of Law and Politics, in PROTEST AND
DISSENT: NOMOS LXII (Melissa Schwartzberg ed., 2020); Tasnim Motala, Essay, "Foreseeable
Violence" & Black Lives Matter: How Mckesson Can Stifle a Movement, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE

61 (2020).
42. See infra Part III.
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the notable exception of burglary, are misdemeanors-more specifically, nonviolent misdemeanors.4 3 I define nonviolent misdemeanors as offenses that

do not include violence or an imminent threat of violence.44
To begin, the power to arrest without a warrant for so-called offenses
against public order serves as a ready tool for police officers to utilize against
protesters. Disorderly conduct is one of these offenses most often weaponized
against activists45 and is appropriately categorized as a traditional crime that

is part of routine policing. Moreover, it can either be a misdemeanor or a lesser
criminal violation based on the circumstances. 46 Generally, disorderly conduct requires that the individual either intends to or recklessly creates the risk
of "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" by "(a) engag[ing] in fighting
or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or (b) mak[ing] unrea-

sonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display, or address[ing]

abusive language to any person present; or (c) creat[ing] a

hazardous or physically offensive condition ....

43.

"4

One person can alone act

See infra notes 44-81 and accompanying text.

44.
A nonviolent misdemeanor would exclude what jurisdictions often define as assault,
assault and battery, or battery. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (defining simple assault); see also N.Y. PENAL CODE § 120.0 (defining assault in the
third degree). It would also exclude criminal misdemeanor threats against a person. See N.Y.
PENAL CODE § 120.15 (defining menacing in the third degree); see also Lange v. California, 141
S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2021) (explaining that "misdemeanors run the gamut of seriousness" from
violent misdemeanor assaults to nonviolent disorderly conduct).

45.

See, e.g., Wiles v. City of New York, 724 F. App'x 52 (2d Cir. 2018) (Occupy Wall

Street protesters arrested for disorderly conduct); Snell v. City of York, 564 F.3d 659 (3d Cir.
2009) (anti-abortion protester arrested for disorderly conduct); Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104,
107 (3d Cir. 2008) (anti-Iraq war protesters "wearing only thong underwear" arrested for disor-

derly conduct); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006) (members of an Onondaga Nation protest regarding a tobacco tax on private property along the highway arrested for
disorderly conduct).

46.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(2) (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("An of-

fense under this section is a petty misdemeanor if the actor's purpose is to cause substantial harm
or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist. Otherwise disorderly conduct is a violation."). Violations are less serious offenses
than misdemeanors. CriminalJustice System forAdults in NYS, N.Y. STATE OFF. MENTAL HEALTH,
https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/manual/html/chapteri.htm [perma.cc/FB6T-MFQN] ("A
Violation is an offense other than a traffic infraction for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment of up to 15 days may be imposed. It is the least serious type of proscribed activity and
encompasses such offenses as harassment, trespass, and disorderly conduct." (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). I use the Model Penal Code definition for many of the offenses in this
Section-particularly those crimes that protesters were arrested for in multiple jurisdictionswith an understanding that the specific elements of the offenses within each jurisdiction likely

differ.
47.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(1) (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962). Courts

have recognized, to varying degrees, First Amendment limitations on the use of disorderly conduct charges that suppress speech and assembly. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, DefiningPeaceably:
Policingthe Line Between Constitutionally ProtectedProtest and Unlawful Assembly, 80 MO. L.
REV. 961, 977 (2015) ("In the 1960s, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that it is unconstitutional for government officials to use crimes such as disorderly conduct, breach of the peace, or
obstructing public passage to suppress constitutionally protected assemblies. Nevertheless, these
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in a disorderly manner and thus commit this offense.48 Because a person can
engage in disorderly conduct in several ways that do not include fighting,
threatening, or engaging in violent conduct, it constitutes a nonviolent offense. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently discussed disorderly conduct as a minor and nonviolent offense.49

In Chicago, approximately 900 people were arrested for either disorderly
conduct or failure to disperse 50 during the first weekend of the George Floyd
protests, 51 which amounted to 80 percent of all arrests that weekend.5 2 In the
New York City George Floyd protests, police officers arrested people en masse
for disorderly conduct, 53 and in Portland, Oregon, 30 percent of the arrests in

the initial five months of the George Floyd protests were for disorderly conduct. 54

That said, the largest percentage of Portland arrests (38 percent) were for
the misdemeanor of interfering with a peace officer, 55 defined as "[i]ntentionally act[ing] in a manner that prevents, or attempts to prevent, a [known]
peace officer . . . from performing [their] lawful duties . . . or . .. [r]efus[ing]

to obey a lawful order by the peace officer ....

"56

Similarly, in the days before

crimes are routinely used to manage and contain the disorder associated with outdoor political
protests."); see also Alicia A. D'Addario, PolicingProtest: ProtectingDissent and Preventing Violence Through First and Fourth Amendment Law, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 97, 120

(2006).
48.
49.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(1) (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962).
See Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2020.

50.
The offense of failure to disperse is discussed in the next section as a protest crime.
See infra Part II.A.2.
51.

See David Eads, Josh McGhee & Matt Chapman, Chicago Police Arrested More People

for Protestingthan for Looting in Early Days of Unrest, ContradictingOriginal Claims, CHI. REP.
(June 16, 2020), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-police-arrested-more-people-for-protesting-than-for-looting-in-early-days-of-unrest-contradicting-original-claims [perma.cc/78Y2F2KJ]. The Chicago police department initially reported that 699 arrests that weekend were for
looting related charges, but that was inaccurate, and the number was actually 213 arrests. Id.

52.

Id.

53.
Beth Fertig, Accused Looters Spark Another Round of Debate on NY's Bail Law,
GOTHAMIST (June 19, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/latest-pushback-bail-lawdas-want-keep-alleged-looters-jail-until-trial [perma.cc/G47V-MW79]; JAMES E. JOHNSON,
DIRECTING AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS IMPACTING THE GEORGE FLOYD PROTESTS IN NEW
YORK CITY 21-22 (2020), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/law/downloads/pdf/ProtestReport-

np.pdf [perma.cc/P5ZN-QUDZ].
54. Hannah Ray Lambert, PolicingPortland'sProtests: 1,000 Arrests, Handful of Prosecutions, KOIN (Nov. 2, 2020, 5:21 PM), https://www.koin.com/news/protests/policing-portlandsprotests-1000-arrests-handful-of-prosecutions [perma.cc/TF9M-JQ4Y].

55.
56.

Id.
OR. REV. STAT. § 162.247 (2019); cf Weed v. Jenkins, 873 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2017)

(highway overpass protesters arrested for Missouri offense of willfully opposing a Missouri State

Highway Patrol member); Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (protesters arrested while dancing inside the Jefferson Memorial, each listening to music on headphones and
dancing in place to honor Thomas Jefferson); Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.
1995) (protester arrested for failure to comply with police orders after writing "[a] police state is
more expensive than a welfare state-we guarantee it" with sidewalk chalk on the ground);

1592

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:1581

a curfew was instituted in Los Angeles, most protest arrestees were charged
with the municipal infraction of failure to obey a police officer.57
Police also arrested protesters for the public order offense of obstructing
highways or streets. 58 This offense is generally defined as the purposeful or
reckless obstruction of "any highway or other public passage, whether alone
or with others." 59 That said, "[n]o person shall be deemed guilty . . solely because of a gathering of persons to hear [them] speak or otherwise communicate, or solely because of being a member of such a gathering." 60 Refusing to
obey a reasonable order to move "to prevent obstruction of a highway or other
public passage" also constitutes a violation. 61 While the Model Penal Code
suggests that obstructing a highway or street is a criminal violation, 62 lawmakers in various states have categorized it as a criminal misdemeanor instead. In

a mass arrest event that took place on June 1, 2020, police arrested almost 700
protesters that marched onto the Margaret Hunt Hill Bridge in Dallas,
Texas. 63 After marchers progressed onto the bridge, police blocked their path

Dinler v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 7921, 2012 WL 4513352 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012) (RNC
protesters arrested for disobeying a lawful police order); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble: Or-

der andDisorderin Law, Politics, and Culture, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 949, 951-52 (2014) (using
Occupy movement's experiences to illustrate the frequency with which police resort to arrests
for minor crimes, including disobeying a lawful order, to control protests, and the lower courts
decisions to uphold those practices in contradiction to history allowing for free assembly).
57.
GERALD CHALEFF, AN INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2020 PROTEST RESPONSE 22, 46-47 (2021), http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/

041321/BPC_21-067.pdf [perma.cc/V2LA-EF4D].
58.
Abu El-Haj, supra note 56 (collecting stories of arrests for protester blocking rightsof-way to argue that these arrests violate Framers' principles).

59.
60.
61.
62.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7(1) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Id.
Id. § 250.7(2).
Id.

63.
Lynnanne Nguyen, 674 ProtestersDetainedon West Dallas BridgeMonday Night Before
Being Released, FOX4 (June 2, 2020), https://www.fox4news.com/news/674-protesters-detainedon-west-dallas-bridge-monday-night-before-being-released [perma.cc/N376-L3AG]; see also
Miles Moffeit, Cassandra Jaramillo & Dianne Solis, 'I Felt Like My Chest Was on Fire': Photo
Shows Dallas Police Officer Shooting Protester with Pepper-Ball Gun, DALL. MORNING NEWS
(Aug. 9, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/investigations/2020/08/09/i-feltlike-my-chest-was-on-fire-photo-shows-cop-blasting-a-peaceful-protester-with-a-pepper-ballgun-at-close-range [perma.cc/35PZ-NPYX]. In another mass arrest, Atlanta police arrested 194
protesters for obstructing the roadway as they stood on the sidewalk in front of the governor's
mansion chanting, "Our streets!" Greg Bluestein, Jeremy Redmon & Vanessa McCray, Demonstrators Take to Atlanta Streetsfor a Second Night, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 30, 2020),
https://www.ajc.com/news/crime--law/protests-take-atlanta-streets-for-second-night/KH JX

744f3mwChVehbECiUL [perma.cc/ND9V-JP6H]; Kornfield et al., supra note 1. While, according to Model Penal Code, obstructing a highway is generally defined as a criminal violation, in
both Texas and Georgia, obstructing a highway is a misdemeanor. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7

(AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962); TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.03 (West. 2021); GA. CODE.
ANN. § 16-11-43 (2018).
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on both sides and tear-gassed and fired projectiles at them. 64 Police then ordered the protesters to lie on the ground and arrested them for misdemeanor
obstructing a highway. 65 That same month in Louisville, Kentucky, in protests
over the killing of Breonna Taylor, 66 police arrested forty-three activists for
Kentucky's version of this misdemeanor crime as they hung a banner with her
image off the Second Street Bridge. 67
Beyond public order offenses, police execute warrantless arrests of protesters via traditional property crimes like trespassing. 68 Criminal trespass is
generally a misdemeanor defined as "enter [ing] or surreptitiously remain [ing]

in any building or occupied structure .... "69 In Nashville, Tennessee, police
arrested fifty-five people in one evening for trespassing as they protested on
the grounds of the state capitol. 70 In Portland, Oregon, police used criminal
trespass to arrest at least several hundred people in the protests over the seventy days after the murder of George Floyd.71 Returning to demonstrations
over Breonna Taylor's shooting, in July 2020, police arrested marchers for
trespassing as they stood in front of the Kentucky Attorney General's home

64.
Jack Howland, Hundreds of George Floyd ProtestersArrested on Margaret Hunt Hill
Bridge in Dallas, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (June 4, 2020, 9:46 PM), https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/dallas/article243188061.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).

65.

Id.

66.
Breonna Taylor was shot and killed by police in her own home when they stormed in to
effectuate a no-knock search warrant relating to her ex-boyfriend. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Derrick
Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What to Know About Breonna Taylor's Death, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html [perma.cc

/TR9W-ZJPK].
67.
Lucas Aulbach & Olivia Krauth, Protest on Louisville's Second Street Bridge Leads
to 43 Arrests, 20 Towed Vehicles, COURIER J. (June 30, 2020, 11:07 AM), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/local/2020/06/29/louisville-protesters-shut-down-clark-memorial-bridge
-monday/3278925001 [perma.cc/UQ4T-FRQE]. In Gainesville, Texas, police arrested three organizers leading a protest of a Confederate statute for obstructing a passageway. Erin Corbett, A
Year of Protest: How Police TargetedActivists After George Floyd's Murder, REFINERY29, (May

25, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2021/05/10485583/george-floyd-protests-police-arrests-aftermath [perma.cc/Z63D-JXSD]. The organizers were arrested via an arrest warrant executed on Friday, meaning they spent the weekend in jail, and after arraignment
were issued $2,500 bail, which is an extraordinary amount for a misdemeanor offense. Id. Obstructing a highway or other public passage is a misdemeanor in Kentucky. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 525.140 (West 2014).
68. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 220.1-224.14 (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(describing traditional offenses against property).

69.
70.

Id. § 221.2.
THP: 55 'Violators'ArrestedforTrespassingat State Capitol, WJHL (July 5,2020, 10:16

AM), https://www.wjhl.com/news/regional/tennessee/thp-55-violators-arrested-for-trespassingat-state-capitol [perma.cc/VY24-8LH3].
71.
Gillian Flaccus, Prosecutor Won't Act on Low-Level PortlandProtestArrests, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Aug. 11, 2020,6:09 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2020-0811/portland-protesters-rally-as-arrest-of-activist-draws-ire [perma.cc/D6XE-SKD8]; see also
Complaint at 20, Tuck Woodstock v. Portland, 20-cv-1035 (D. Or. June 28, 2020) [hereinafter
Index Newspaper Complaint].
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demanding the indictment of the involved police officers.72 Notwithstanding,
police use of criminal trespass to arrest protesters is not unique to the 2020
racial justice protests, with cited incidents spanning back decades.71
However, in the demonstration outside the Kentucky Attorney General's
home, police also arrested protesters for the felony crime of intimidating a
participant in the legal process under the theory that activists "attempt[ed] to
influence the decision of the attorney general with their actions."7 4 The charge
of intimidating a participant in the legal process is intended to address witness
or juror intimidation. 75 It requires intimidation by either the "use of physical
force or a threat." 76 Its use in the context of demonstrations that seek to persuade a public official to exercise their duties justly is a testament to the expansive and abusive arrest power left in the hands of police. In this context,
law enforcement's arrest power only seems limited by their imagination of
what charges to concoct.
Burglary, another offense against property,77 deserves special attention.
Unlike most of the crimes that police used to arrest 2020 racial justice protesters and are discussed in this Section, burglary is usually classified as a felony.78
Notably, and as will be discussed in the next section, in the early days of the
George Floyd protests, New York City police arrested a large number of
(mostly Black) protesters for burglary in the third degree. 79 The elements of
burglary generally include "enter[ing]

a building or ...

structure ...

with

[the] purpose to commit a crime therein.. .. "80 Burglary's definition largely
resembles a trespass but for the requisite intent to commit a crime therein. In
New York, the underlying crime for burglary in the third degree can include

72.

Billy Kobin, Celebrities, Rappers, Civil Rights Leaders: Who Was Arrested DuringPro-

test at Daniel Cameron's Home?, COURIER J. (July 28, 2020, 12:18 PM), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/local/2020/07/15/87-people-arrested-kentucky-attorney-general-daniel-cameron-house/5441508002 [perma.cc/95NS-JTML].

73.

See, e.g., Meyers v. City of New York, 812 F. App'x. 11 (2d Cir. 2020) (Occupy pro-

testers arrested in a park for trespassing); Mauler v. Arlotto, 777 F. App'x. 59 (4th Cir. 2019)
(transgender protester arrested for trespass for protesting mistreatment of transgender individ-

uals outside board of education's office); Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2013)
(animal rights activists arrested for criminal trespass while protesting treatment of animals at
the circus); Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1998) (protester arrested for trespass after
attempting to enter polling place while wearing a campaign button); Cyr v. City of Dallas, No.

96-10937, 1997 WL 255987 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 1997) (anti-abortion protesters arrested for criminal
trespass inside clinic).
74.

Kobin, supra note 72.

75.

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.040 (LexisNexis 2021).
Id.

76.

77.
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART II DEFINITION OF SPECIFIC
CRIMES (AM. L. INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).

78.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962) (distin-

guishing burglary in the second degree and third degree as both felonies).
79.

See infra Section IIB.

80.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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any crime and need not necessarily be a felony itself.81 At the scene, a police
officer decides whether an arrestee has the requisite intent for burglary. Based
on what we understand about the disparate arrests of Black individuals and

the open question of whether this pattern is reproduced in protest-related arrests, 82 it is reasonable to wonder whether the burglarious intent is in the eye
of the beholder. Outside New York City, police officers in Indianapolis also
arrested protestors, and prosecutors charged those same individuals with burglary.83 According to the Indiana Code, a person has the requisite burglarious
intent if they intend to commit either a theft or a felony. 84
The discussion above focuses on the traditional and mostly misdemeanor
crimes police often weaponized against protesters during the 2020 racial justice protests. Beyond traditional crimes, however, law enforcement can employ additional crimes specifically applicable to circumstances that are likely
to exist during large protests, where crowds and standing emergency orders
are often involved.
2.

Protest Crimes

This category includes offenses-such as rioting, unlawful assembly, and
failure to disperse-specifically designed for the government to respond to
perceived civil unrest. These criminal offenses are also part of a police officer's
toolkit to confront protesters. Law enforcement perceive protest, particularly
by Black activists,8 5 as unrest that merits government interference and control.

81.

CompareN.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 2021) ("A person is guilty of burglary

in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to
commit a crime therein.") with CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2021) ("Every person who enters
any house. . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.")
and MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 14 (2020) ("Whoever breaks and enters a dwelling house in the
night time, with intent to commit a felony, or whoever, after having entered with such intent,
breaks such dwelling house in the night time, any person being then lawfully therein .....
82.

See infra Section IIB.

83.
Fourteen people were charged with burglary in the first weekend of the George Floyd
protests. Dwight Adams, No Chargesfor 41 Nonviolent Protesters in Indianapolis,Marion County
ProsecutorSays, INDYSTAR (June 1, 2020,4:03 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/
2020/06/01/no-charges-nonviolent-protesters-marion-county-indianapolis-protests/5310288002

[perma.cc/454F-QWE2].
84. IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (2017).
85.
See supra Section I.A; see also Karen J. Pita Loor, Tear Gas + Water Hoses + Dispersal
Orders: The Fourth Amendment EndorsesBrutality in ProtestPolicing, 100 B.U. L. REV. 817, 830
(2020) (discussing how activists of color are more likely to be victims of police violence). Furthermore, recent data suggest that beyond race, police are more likely to view politically leftleaning activists as violent and thus respond more aggressively to them than to politically rightleaning activists. Lois Beckett, US Police Three Times as Likely to Use ForceAgainst Leftwing Protesters, Data Finds, GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2021, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/jan/13/us-police-use-of-force-protests-black-lives-matter-far-right
[perma.cc/W2TU-

Q5NH].
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While these categories of crimes have existed since the country's founding,8 6
American society's demand for order at all times-including during pro-

tests-has increased over the centuries and consequently lowered the bar for
both the crimes of rioting and unlawful assembly so that now neither requires
"an actual and imminent threat of violence." 8 7 Similarly, failure to disperse

does not require that the conduct of those refusing to leave result in violence;
rather, it is enough that it causes "inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm." 88 But
"[n]ineteenth-century Americans had a much higher social and legal thresh-

old for the irritations that come with democracy. . . . [T]he right of assembly .... was understood to require tolerance for the unruly, uncivil, and
incoherent elements of protest."8 9 Unlike today, "[g]overnment officials could
not regulate . .. assemblies without showing a breach of the peace, defined in
terms of levels of actual violence." 90
According to the current Model Penal Code definition, someone
is guilty of riot... if [they] participate[] with [two] or more others in a
course of disorderly conduct: (a) with purpose to commit or facilitate the
commission of a felony or misdemeanor; (b) with purpose to prevent or coerce official action; or (c) when the actor or any other participant to the
knowledge of the actor uses or plans to use a firearm or other deadly

weapon. 91

While the Model Penal Code labels rioting as a felony, individual states differ,
with some classifying it as a misdemeanor. 92 As evident in the definition and
contrary to what lay people may imagine amounts to a riot, rioting does not
generally require the participation of a large crowd, property damage, or the

86.
See John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control, 64 UCLA L. REV. 2, 10 (2017);
Abu El-Haj, supra note 47, at 967-972 (discussing the historical underpinnings of the unlawful
assembly offense). Professor Inazu also discusses the colonial foundations criminalizing the failure to disperse. See Inazu, supra, at 11-13.
87.

Abu El-Haj, supra note 41, at 205.

88.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1(2) (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962).

89.

Abu El-Haj, supra note 41, at 205 (footnote omitted).

90.
91.

Id.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1(1) (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also

Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 17-26
(2012), for a review of the number of people, the type of group conduct, the type of injury or
damage, and the type of intent that may constitute a riot in various state jurisdictions' antiriot
statutes and laws.

92.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1(1) (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962); see, e.g.,

IDAHO CODE § 18-6402 (2016) (distinguishing misdemeanor and felony riots in Idaho); FLA.
STAT. § 870.01 (2021) (distinguishing misdemeanor and felony riots in Florida); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.05 (McKinney 2021) (classifying riot in the second degree as a Class A misdemeanor);
H.B. 784, 133rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2020) (proposing increasing the penalty for riot
from misdemeanor to felony).
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threat of physical harm. 93 As previously mentioned, there need not be an actual and imminent threat of violence for someone to engage in the crime of
rioting. Instead, the crime of riot is expansive, thus providing police wide latitude to arrest.
Furthermore, not only is rioting a crime across states, but, in some states
and via federal statute, incitement to riot is also a crime and thus presents an
additional avenue to arrest. 94 One important note on this latter crime is that

in Brandenburgv. Ohio, the Supreme Court established that a state may not
constitutionally "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 95 State
statutes vary widely in their definition of incitement for purposes of this offense. 96 As Professor Margot Kaminski has previously noted, some incitement
to riot criminal statutes do not include the element of likelihood to incite imminent lawless action, which may present a First Amendment problem. 97 In

the first two weeks of the George Floyd protests, people were arrested for riotrelated offenses in Miami, Cleveland, Austin, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Dallas, and Portland. 98 In both Cleveland and Portland, this was the second most

frequent crime for which police arrested protesters. 99

93.
See Kaminski, supra note 91, at 9 ("When most of us think of 'riot,' we think of large
crowds that cause damage .... But the statutory and common-law definitions of riot include
surprisingly small gatherings that do not cause physical harm at all.").
94.
Id. at 10-13. Federal statute makes inciting a riot a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 2102, but it may
either be a felony or a misdemeanor state crime depending on the jurisdiction. See, e.g, CAL.

PENAL CODE § 404.6 (West 2021) (misdemeanor); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-178 (2021) (Class A
misdemeanor); D.C. CODE § 22-1322 (2021) (misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. § 870.01 (2021) (thirddegree felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6201(b) (2019) (felony); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-104
(2021) (distinguishing misdemeanor and felony incitement); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.2 (distinguishing misdemeanor and felony incitement); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5-130 (2020) (distinguishing felony and misdemeanor classifications based on underlying offense).

95.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (" '[T]he mere abstract teach-

ing .... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.' A statute which
fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) (citations omitted)).
96.
See Kaminski, supra note 91, at 10-13. The Model Penal Code does not define Incitement to Riot.

97.

See id. at 28-29.

98.

See Kornfield et al., supra note 1; Moffeit et al., supra note 63.

99.

Kornfield et. al., supra note 1; cf Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.

2012) (protesters at the 2008 RNC arrested for rioting); Carr v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d
401 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (between sixty-five and seventy-five protesters marching after an "AntiInaugural Concert" carrying handmade torches arrested for parading without a permit and rioting).
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Unlawful assembly "criminalizes a group of people who are gathered in a

common location and agree to commit some future unlawful act." 100 California Penal Code Section 407 defines the misdemeanor of unlawful assembly as
"[w]henever two or more persons assemble together to do an unlawful act, or
do a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous manner." 101 An imminent threat of violence is not an element of the offense. Also, as the text of the
statute conveys, the unlawful act need not precede the arrest. Rather, it is the
gathering with the intent to commit such an act that warrants arrest pursuant

to unlawful assembly. The statute thus provides extreme leeway to law enforcement judgments about the intent of gathered protesters. Law enforcement's perceptions of activists' intent may vary depending on the cause and
race of protesters. 102
In the Black Lives Matter Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles lawsuit regard-

ing the George Floyd demonstrations, activists provided several accounts of
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers in riot gear surrounding large
groups of people engaged in lawful protests, declaring an unlawful assembly,
and then proceeding to arrest the whole group en masse. 103 This conduct was
in violation of both a 2005 settlement agreement and a 2007 settlement agree-

ment where the City of Los Angeles agreed that before declaring any unlawful
assembly, LAPD would attempt to distinguish individuals engaging in unlawful conduct from law-abiding protestors, separate them, and arrest only those
wrongdoers. 104 The settlement agreements resulted from lawsuits brought
against LAPD for its egregious policing during prior protests involving the
Democratic National Convention and immigrant worker protesters. 10 5

Minneapolis police also arrested almost fifty (of 300) protesters who were
marching after Derek Chauvin was released on bail pending his trial for the

murder of George Floyd for unlawful assembly a group. 106 One "live news
feed . . showed several people being ordered to get down on the ground in

100.
Inazu, supra note 86, at 6. The Model Penal Code does not contain a definition of
unlawful assembly.

101.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 407 (West 2021).

102.
See Loor, supra note 85, at 830 (discussing how activists of color and left-and rightleaning protesters are treated differently by law enforcement); accord Beckett, supra note 85.

103. Complaint at 12-14,23-24,26,28, Black Lives Matter L.A. v. City of Los Angeles, No.
20-cv-05027 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2021) [hereinafter L.A. Complaint].
104.
See id. at 45-48 (discussingsettlement in NationalLawyers Guild v. City ofLos Angeles
and Multi-Ethnic Worker OrganizingNetwork v. City of Los Angeles); CHALEFF, supra note 57,
at 17.
105.

See CHALEFF, supra note 57, at 16-17, apps. 5, 6.

106.
Abby Simons, More than 50 ProtestersArrested DuringFaceoffwith Law Enforcement in
MinneapolisAfter Derek Chauvin Release, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 8, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://www.startribune.com/51-arrested-near-fifth-precinct-hq-after-protesting-chauvin-release/572670582

[perma.cc/3AEP-N5GP].
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preparation for arrest on suspicion of illegal assembly."107 Besides the one person who was arrested for fourth-degree assault, nothing suggests that any of
the other protesters were anything but peaceful. 108
Whether police officers declare an unlawful assembly or not, once officers
demand that individuals leave an area, those who remain can be charged with

failure to disperse. Again, a threat of violence is not an element of the offense
of failure to disperse. Generally, a person can be guilty of the misdemeanor
offense of failure to disperse if they are one of three or more persons engaging
in "disorderly conduct likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" and they "refuse[] or knowingly fail[] to obey" a

police officer's lawful order to disperse. 109 Although individuals can be
charged with failure to disperse outside the context of a protest, such as sports
fans or concertgoers who refuse to leave a venue or area, the offense is frequently used against protesters.11 0 As previously mentioned, in the first weekend after George Floyd's murder, Chicago police arrested 900 people for either
failure to disperse or disorderly conduct-accounting for 80 percent of all protest-related arrests." In Los Angeles, approximately 2,500 of the 3,000 arrests

in the first week of the George Floyd protests were either for failure to disperse
or violation of curfew.1 12

107.
Id. Minnesota defines the misdemeanor of unlawful assembly as "[w]hen three or
more persons assemble, each participant is guilty ... if the assembly is: (1) with intent to commit
any unlawful act by force; or (2) with intent to carry out any purpose in such manner as will
disturb or threaten the public peace; or (3) without unlawful purpose, but the participants so
conduct themselves in a disorderly manner as to disturb or threaten the public peace." MINN.
STAT. § 609.705 (2008). Portland police officers also arrested people for unlawful assembly, including a student who started recording officers as they approached the booth where he was
handing out medical supplies to protesters. See Lindsay Nadrich, OHSU StudentArrested Handing
Medical Supplies to Protesters, KOIN (June 18, 2020, 5:14 PM), https://www.koin.com/news/protests/ohsu-student-arrested-handing-medical-supplies-to-protesters [perma.cc/NX5E-FYN9]; see
also Index Newspaper Complaint, supranote 71, at 22; Complaint at 33, Wise v. City of Portland,

No. 20-cv-01193 (D. Or. July 22, 2020).
108.

See Simons, supra note 106.

109.
110.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1(2) (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962).
E.g., Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 2011) (anti-Iraq protest

resulting in 900 arrests for refusal to disperse); Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir.
1996) (class action lawsuit following "[flour hundred to five hundred" arrests for failure to dis-

perse at Rodney King riots in Los Angeles); Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (persons arrested for refusal to disperse while they were participating in a peaceful Quaker
vigil of prayer). In its investigation of the police's response to the 2014 Ferguson uprising, the St.
Louis County Police Department reported to Amnesty International that 132 protesters were arrested for refusal to disperse in the first twelve days after Michael Brown's shooting in Ferguson.
AMNESTY INT'L, ON THE STREETS OF AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN FERGUSON 8 (2014),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/onthestreetsofamericaamnestyinter-

national.pdf [perma.cc/A7ST-RX2].
111.

Eads et al., supra note 51.

112.
Justine Coleman, Thousands of LA ProtestersArrested over Curfew Won't Be Charged,
HILL (June 8,2020,7:45 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/501752-thousands-of-laprotesters-arrested-over-curfew-wont-be-charged [perma.cc/X7VE-7TLX]; see also CHALEFF, supra note 57, at 10.
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Arrests During a State of Emergency

State and local officials have the authority to declare an emergency in response to a perceived crisis.1 3 All state constitutions and statutes provide the
governor the power to unilaterally proclaim an emergency either statewide or
within a particular area of the state.1 4 Local laws also generally provide

mayors or the city council with the power to proclaim a local emergency, although a city official's power may have more limitations than that of a gover-

nor.1 5 Governors and city officials widely used this power to declare
emergencies in response to the 2020 racial justice protests. 1 6 Neither courts
nor legislatures provide a sufficient check on a government official's use of
emergency power to respond to protests." 7 After declaring a state of emergency, conduct that is lawful-and even constitutionally protected like protest
activity-warrants arrest. Furthermore, conduct that is unlawful may be pun-

ished more severely during a state of emergency, as in the case of the crime of
looting.1 ' Failure to abide by an emergency order during a state of emergency
is itself an arrestable felony or misdemeanor, depending on the jurisdiction.119
Emergency declarations and executive orders expand a police officer's power
of warrantless arrest.

Once there is a declared emergency, governors and city officials can enact
curfews through executive order. 120 A curfew "forbids people (or certain classes of them, such as minors) from being outdoors . . during specified

113.
Karen J. Pita Loor, When ProtestIs the Disaster: ConstitutionalImplications of State
andLocal Emergency Power, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2019). In this prior article, I critiqued state
and local official's use of emergency powers and the emergency management bureaucracy to
respond to protests.

114.
115.

See id. at Part II.
Id.

116.
Charity L. Scott, Did the Curfews Work? Experts Aren't So Sure, WALL ST. J. (June 9,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/did-the-curfews-work-experts-arent-so-sure-

11591704005 [perma.cc/87VL-QACQ].
117.
Courts will only ask whether there was a good faith basis to declare a state of emergency and will easily find such a basis once the government actor asserts a threat to public safety.
Loor, supra note 113, at 48. Even when legislators have some authority to limit or terminate the
emergency, they do not use this authority to curtail an emergency declaration. Id. at 17-19.
118.

See infra notes 134-140 and accompanying text.

119.
See Loor, supra note 113, at 17 (citing Missouri and North Dakota statutes as examples
of jurisdictions where failure to follow an emergency order is classified as a misdemeanor).
120.
See id at 16-17. Without a state of emergency, courts will find curfews unconstitutional unless they contain provisions that provide an exemption for First Amendment activity.

Id. at 47-50.
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hours."12 1 In most jurisdictions, violating a curfew is a misdemeanor. 122 During the George Floyd protests, curfews spread like windswept wildfire. 123 Just
like curfews ran rampant, so did arrests for curfew violations. The Washington
Post's analysis of 2,600 arrests across fifteen cities during the first two weeks
of protests disclosed that most individuals were arrested for either violating a
curfew or an emergency order. 124 According to the Washington Post, this was
most clear in Miami, Cleveland, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta. 125 While the

Washington Post's analysis did not speak to the voluminous Los Angeles arrests, the L.A. figures now demonstrate that although the city might have been
unusual in the sheer number of arrests, it was not anomalous in the type of
offenses police weaponized against protesters. The majority of arrests by the

121.
Curfew, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The Model Penal Code does not
define the offense of violating a curfew.
122.
See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-108 (making curfew violation a Class B misdemeanor); S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 7.17(b) (making violation of emergency order, including a curfew,
a misdemeanor); H.B. 2, 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2021) (proposing an enhanced Class A misdemeanor penalty for curfew violation); DOUGLAS A. DUCEY, DECLARATION OF STATE OF
EMERGENCY (2020), https://azgovernor.gov/sites/default/files/20200531150110495.pdf [perma.
cc/K492-PSW8] (Arizona's executive order imposing Class 1 misdemeanor penalties for curfew
violations). The only felony charge for a curfew violation is currently pending in Alabama. As
written, the Alabama bill cited previously (13A-11-3.1(a) and (b)) would make aggravated riot,
which includes breaking curfew in a riot that causes more than $2,500 in damage, a class C felony.
123.

See State, Local Curfew Orders,REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (last updated

June 12, 2020), https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/ldVQpm9U5fxDKT43D9Xy3xOZSA
7NeM8FUIGwPwjNOo/edit-gid=0 [perma.cc/U3V8-QJ26] (unpublished spreadsheet). The
spreadsheet shows that in most jurisdictions, members of the press were supposed to be exempt from the curfew. Id. Curfew orders also exempted legal observers, essential workers, and
individuals experiencing homelessness. See Katie Warren & Joey Hadden, How All 50 States Are
Responding to the George Floyd Protests,from Imposing Curfews to CallingIn the NationalGuard,
BUS. INSIDER (June 4, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-states-responsegeorge-floyd-protests-curfews-national-guard-2020-6 [perma.cc/CNY9-32E8]; Jake Offenhartz,
"Round Up the Green Hats": NYPD Accused of Deliberately TargetingLegal Observers in Brutal
Bronx Mass Arrest, GOTHAMIST (June 8, 2020, 9:13 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/roundgreen-hats-nypd-accused-deliberately-targeting-legal-observers-brutal-bronx-mass-arrest [perma

.cc/5AZW-HCJ8]; Benjamin Oreskes, ConfusingAlerts and Nowhere to Go: Homeless Angelenos
Exempt from Curfew Struggle Even More, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.
latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2020-06-04/homeless-people-suffer-as-a-result-of-curfew-and-unrest [perma.cc/YZ5V-6BFT]. Despite these expressed limitations, police officers
sometimes ignored these exemptions and still arrested these individuals. See, e.g., Complaint,
Black Lives Matter L.A. v. Garcetti, No. 20-CV-04940 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2020) [hereinafter Garcetti Complaint] (alleging arrests of journalists in violation of curfew); Robert Davis, Homeless
Communities Caught in Crossfire During George Floyd Protests, DENVER VOICE (June 29, 2020),
https://www.denvervoice.org/archive/2020/6/30/homeless-communities-caught-in-crossfire-during-george-floyd-protests [perma.cc/HA5W-P296].
124.

Kornfield et al., supra note 1.

125.

See id.
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LAPD were also for curfew violations, as well as failure to obey a police order. 12 6 While some activists likely intentionally violated the curfew as its own
form of protest,127 compliance with curfew in Los Angeles was challenging,
with officials enacting or changing curfews at the last minute and failing to

properly communicate curfew information. 128 The LAPD also arrested individuals experiencing homelessness for curfew violations who not only had no
way to comply with the orders but were also supposed to be exempt from
them. 129 In Los Angeles, police lined up in riot gear several rows deep and
proceeded to surround and block crowds and then arrest everyone once the
curfew was in effect. 130 In other cities, like San Francisco and Chicago, compliance with curfews was similarly difficult, with mayors "impos[ing] aggressive curfew orders on short notice, leading to hundreds of arrests for failure

126.
See CHALEFF, supra note 57, at 10; Garcetti Complaint, supra note 123, at 7; see also
EXECUTIVE ORDER OF THE CHAIR OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
FOLLOWING PROCLAMATION OF EXISTENCE OF A LOCAL EMERGENCY DUE TO CIVIL UNREST
(2020), https://lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/Curfew-order.pdf [perma.cc/8SME-PGNM]
("Any violation of this Order is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by
imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months, or both.").
127.

See, e.g., Zeeshan Aleem, Dozens of Cities Across the CountryAre Imposing Curfews.

Do They Work?, VOX (May 31, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/31/21275996/curfew-george-floyd-protest-los-angeles [perma.cc/UD58-M87S].
128.
See L.A. Complaint, supra note 103, at 3-4; Garcetti Complaint, supra note 123, at 57; see also Erika Martin, Glendale Curfew WarningAccidentally Sent to All of L.A. County; Countywide Curfew Is Still 6 P.M., KTLA (June 1, 2020,6:05 PM), https://ktla.com/news/local-news/glendale-curfew-warning-accidentally-sent-to-all-of-l-a-county-countywide-curfew-is-still-6-p-m

[perma.cc/9GYQ-9PLB].
129. L.A. Complaint, supra note 103, at 1, 4, 11, 41; Sydney Kalich, List: Curfews Announced
Throughout Southern California,NBC4 (June 3, 2020, 1:38 PM), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/
news/news-curfews-announced-throughout-the-los-angeles-area/2371629
[perma.cc/J9ZGT28H]; see also Sheriff Villanueva Orders County-Wide CurfewforLos Angeles County, NIXLE (May

31, 2020, 6:49 PM), https://local.nixle.com/alert/8026754 [perma.cc/9HTM-XEDQ] ("This order
does not apply to ... people experiencing homelessness and without access to a viable shelter,
and individuals seeking medical treatment.").
130.
L.A. Complaint, supra note 103, at 9-10; see also Complaint at 3, Anti-Police Terror
Project v. City of Oakland, No. 20-cv-03866 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2020) ("Demonstrators who
otherwise intended to comply with the curfew were kettled and arrested for being in violation of
the curfew.").
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to disperse."131 Likewise, in Minneapolis, the overwhelming majority of protesters were charged with curfew violations.13 2 In New York City, people were
also arrested for curfew violations.133
A handful of states have looting laws for property crimes committed during a state of emergency. 134 While these statutes apply in any emergency-not
just those proclaimed as a result of so-called "riots" and "mobs" but also due
to natural disasters-lawmakers largely passed these laws during the 1960s
civil rights era, indicating that they were intended to quash protests. 135 Admittedly, police officers do not arrest activists for looting with the same frequency
as they do for the other crimes discussed, yet protesters still face occasional
arrests for these crimes. In Los Angeles and Columbia, South Carolina, it is
documented that police arrested protesters for the crime of looting during the
George Floyd protests. 136
Moreover, individuals who are charged with these looting crimes-instead of the analogous nonemergency property offenses-may face harsher
penalties or mandatory minimum sentences. Thus, in Louisiana, someone
charged with looting because of conduct that would otherwise constitute burglary-except for the element that "normal security of property is not present
by virtue of [, among other things,] a riot [or] mob"-faces up to fifteen years

131.
See Corbett, supra note 67; see also Kiran Misra, Most of the People Arrested at the Protests Were Black, CHI. READER (June 30, 2020), https://chicagoreader.com/news-politics/most-ofthe-people-arrested-at-the-protests-were-black [perma.cc/65EV-GLEF].
132.
Data suggests that over 500 people had pending cases about a month and a half after
George Floyd's murder, but 493 of them were charged with just violating curfew or unlawful assembly. Julia Lurie, Weeks Later, 500 People Still Face Chargesfor Peacefully Protestingin Minneapolis, MOTHER JONES (July 15, 2020), https://www.motherones.com/crime-justice/2020/07/weekslater-500-people-still-face-charges-for-peacefully-protesting-in-minneapolis [perma.cc/5WBBXHVR]. In Minnesota, violating a curfew is a misdemeanor that can be punished by up to a

$1,000 fine or ninety days in jail. MINN. STAT. § 12.45 (2019). See generally Complaint at 8,
Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-cv-01302 (D. Minn. June 2, 2020) (discussing specific
examples of journalists arrested for curfew violations at the protest).

133.
134.

See infra Part II.B.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 463(a) (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:62.5 (2011); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 97-17-65 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.6 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (2021).
135.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 463(a) (West 2019) ("resulting from ... riot"); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:62.5 (2011) ("by virtue of a riot, mob, or other human agency"); accord MIss. CODE
ANN. § 97-17-65 (2020). See also Lisa Grow Sun, DisasterMythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1131, 1191 (2011), and Roger D. Scott, Looting: A Proposalto Enhance the Sanctionsfor
Aggravated PropertyCrime, 11 J.L. & POL. 129 (1995), for a discussion of the historical foundation of these looting statutes.
136.
Hundreds were charged in Los Angeles under burglary and the California looting law
during the 2020 George Floyd protests. AP Tally: Arrests at Widespread US Protests Hit 10,000,
VOA NEWS (June 4, 2020, 8:27 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/usa nation-turmoil-george-

floyd-protestsap-tally-arrests-widespread-us-protests-hit- 1/6190506.html [perma.cc/MNJ35M5P]. Likewise, nine were charged with looting at the South Carolina George Floyd protests.
Bristow Marchant, Nine Accused of Looting in Columbia Protests, STATE (June 1, 2020),
https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article243182716.html [perma.cc/VQ7S-V6XH].
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in prison, while burglary alone is punishable by up to twelve years. 137 Further,
if the looting occurs during a state of emergency, the person charged faces a
mandatory minimum sentence of three years. 138 In Mississippi, the difference
between the penalties for looting and the analogous crime of burglary is limited to one more year in prison, but prosecution for looting expressly does not
preclude prosecution for other larceny or burglary crimes-suggesting that a
person could face concurrent prosecutions for the same conduct under looting and similar nonemergency offenses. 139 In California, someone who com-

mits looting during a "state of emergency" or "local emergency" by engaging
in conduct that would amount in a nonemergency to a second degree burglary
faces the same potential one-year sentence; however, the person convicted of
"looting burglary" has a presumptively mandatory 180-day jail sentence,
whereas second degree burglary has no mandatory minimum sentence. 140

Beyond curfew violations and looting offenses, during a state of emergency, government officials and law enforcement may enact or enforce ad hoc

emergency rules that attempt to expand police officers' authority to engage in
warrantless arrests. 141 Thus, LAPD officers took into custody people charged
with only infractions-namely failure to obey a police officer-in contravention of California law requiring that individuals charged with infractions be

released at the scene after being provided with a citation to appear in court at
a later date. 142 Considering that failure to obey a police officer was one of the
most charged offenses during the George Floyd protests in Los Angeles, a significant number of protesters were wrongfully taken into custody as a result
of this LAPD practice. 143 According to plaintiffs in Black Lives Matter L.A. v.
City of Los Angeles, this was not due to an inadvertent failure by the LAPD to

efficiently prepare citation paperwork; instead, officers often completed the
citations at the scene, placed the citations in the arrestees' pockets, and then
proceeded to still hold individuals in custody for hours before booking them

137.

LA. STAT. ANN.

138.
139.

Id. § 14:62.5.

§ 14:62-62.5 (2011).

MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-17-6, -33.

140.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 463(a) (West 2019) ("Any person convicted under this [looting]
subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition
thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days, except that the court may, in the case
where the interest of justice would best be served, reduce or eliminate that mandatory jail sentence, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interest of justice would best be served by that disposition."); Id. § 461(b) (West
2011) ("Burglary in the second degree [is punishable] by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year or imprisonment.").

141.
142.

See, e.g., L.A. Complaint, supra note 103, at 4, 11, 15, 31, 33, 36.
See id. at 4, 11, 15, 31, 33, 36, 39, 49. Failure to obey a police officer is a violation of

Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 80.02, which provides that "[n]o person shall willfully fail
or refuse to comply with any lawful order, direction or signal of a Police Officer or Traffic Officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, violation of this Section is an infraction." L.A. MUN. CODE § 80.02. With very limited exceptions, individuals arrested for infractions
are not to be taken into custody. CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.5(a) (West 2021).
143.

See CHALEFF, supra note 57, at 32-33; L.A. Complaint, supra note 103, at 1.
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at a separate location. 144 In New York City, public defenders brought a lawsuit
when arrestee protesters were held in jail for over twenty-four hours without
appearing before a judge for arraignment, in blatant contravention of New

York constitutional law. 145 A spokesperson for the New York courts disclosed
that the delay was due to NYPD officers filing the necessary paperwork for
arraignment at a "glacial[ ]" pace. 146

These arbitrary emergency rules are not unique to the 2020 racial justice
protests. During the 2014 Ferguson uprising, police created and applied an ad
hoc "keep moving" rule to demonstrations, meaning that protesters who
stopped moving while on the streets protesting risked being arrested. 147 Of
course, standing still was not a crime except when the state of emergency was
in effect. However, for five days during the state of emergency in Ferguson,
police arrested protesters pursuant to this ad hoc rule. 148
B.

Demographicsof New York City Arrestees During the 2020 George Floyd
Protests

The number of arrests during the 2020 George Floyd protests was staggering. An investigation by The Washington Post disclosed that in the first two
weeks of the protests, "17,000 protesters [were] arrested in ... 50 major cities,
149
[with] an unknown number of demonstrators in smaller cities." The Washington Post also gathered demographic data for about 1,000 arrests and found

144.

L.A. Complaint, supra note 103, at 11, 17, 28, 31, 33, 34, 36.

145.
Madeleine Carlisle, Hundreds of Protesters Being DetainedIllegally in New York City,
Lawsuit Against NYPD Alleges, TIME (June 4,2020,9:30 AM), https://time.com/5847453/protestsillegal-jail-new-york-nypd-george-floyd-coronavirus [perma.cc/2PBL-NXRS].
146.
Rosa Goldensohn, Claudia Irizarry Aponte & Reuven Blau, Scores Arrested amid
Floyd ProtestsLocked Upfor More than 24 Hours in NYC: Lawsuit, CITY (June 2,2020,8:22 PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/6/2/21278679/george-floyd-death-protesters-locked-up-over-24hours-in-nyc-lawsuit-says [perma.cc/EYS4-XAR7]. While not a rule that expanded police officers' power to arrest, another example of an ad hoc rule during a state of emergency was Maryland
Governor, Lawrence Hogan's, executive order suspending Maryland Rule 4-212(f) requiring
that arrestees appear before a judge within twenty-four hours of arrest. See Letter from Governor
Lawrence J. Hogan to Administrative J. Barbara Baer Waxman, Governor's Proclamation Sus-

pending Maryland Rule 4-212(f) (Apr. 28, 2015) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). As a
result of this executive order, approximately 100 people were held in excess of twenty-four hours
until public defenders filed habeas corpus petitions demanding their release from custody. Oliver
Laughland, Paul Lewis, Jon Swaine & Ben Jacobs, Baltimore: Hail of Habeas Corpus Petitions
Leads to Release of Riot Suspects, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2015, 1:46 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/30/baltimore-hail-of-habeas-corpus-petitions-leads-to-release-ofriot-suspects [perma.cc/L94J-W54J]; see also Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, 11, Carrie

v. Scruggs, No. 24H15000166 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City Apr. 29, 2015).
147.
der).

See Loor, supra note 113, at Section IILE (discussing Ferguson's "keep moving" or-

148.
Id. The "keep moving" strategy was challenged in Abdullah v. County of St. Louis and
eventually found to violate the Fourth and First Amendment and due process. Abdullah v.

County of Saint Louis, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936, 946-47 (E.D. Mo. 2014).
149.

Kornfield et al., supra note 1.
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that about half of the arrestees were identified as white and the other half as
Black. 150 Black people do not compose even close to half of the U.S. population, so if the protests were as racially diverse as many remarked, 151 protestrelated arrests should have been similarly diverse. Yet there were accounts of
Black people being arrested at rates higher than their overall representation in
the general area population in places as varied as Chicago, Illinois,15 2 Portland,

Oregon,153 and Louisville, Kentucky. 154
Adding to these statistics about the apparently lopsided racial breakdown
of arrests are individual anecdotes of the targeting of Black protesters. 155 Louisville activists have pointed to the arrests of two video livestreamers as an example of discriminatory policing. 156 On June 30, 2020, police arrested both
Chea Woolfolk, a Black woman, and Jason Downey, a white man, in the Jefferson Square Park area. 157 Both "were standing near each other on the side-

walk when they were taken into custody, [but] each was issued different
charges: misdemeanor failure to disperse for Downey and felony rioting for

150.

Id.

151.

See Quick Facts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quick-

facts/fact/table/US/RHI225219#RHI225219 [perma.cc/63Q3-XWL8] (finding 13.4 percent of
reporting United States population identified as Black); Melissa Chan, These Black Lives Matter
ProtestersHadNo Idea How One Arrest CouldAlter TheirLives, TIME (Aug. 19, 2020, 10:15 AM),
https://time.com/5880229/arrests-black-lives-matter-protests-impact [perma.cc/XV6S-9E3H].
152.
The weekend after George Floyd's murder, Chicago police arrested 2,172 people during protests. Misra, supra note 131. Over 70 percent of those arrested were Black, despite 32
percent of the city's population being Black. Id. The largest racial group in Chicago is white. Id.
Furthermore, police abuse of activists was widely reported at these protests, with accounts of
police escalation, excessive force, and unlawful arrests, resulting in 162 complaints filed regarding police misconduct against protesters. Id.
153.
In Portland, Oregon, reports suggest that Black people were nearly twice as likely to
be arrested as white people at the summer 2020 protests. Karina Brown, Black People Nearly
Twice as Likely as Whites to Be Arrested at PortlandProtests, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug.
21, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/black-people-nearly-twice-as-likely-as-whites-tobe-arrested-at-portland-protests [perma.cc/UCM6-3SAF].
154.
Data for three months following the murder of George Floyd show that Black people
were overrepresented in arrests during protests. Bailey Loosemore, 'It's by Design':Black People
Most Often Chargedwith Felonies amid Louisville Protests, COURIER J. (Jan. 22, 2021, 8:44 PM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2020/ 10/29/breonna-taylor-protests-blackpeople-most-often-charged-with-felonies/6040250002 [perma.cc/9J35-9VZZ]. Black activists
accounted for 53 percent of arrests generally and 69 percent of felony arrests, although they account for 23.6 percent of the overall population in Louisville. Id.; QuickFacts:Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (Balance), Kentucky, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/louisvillejeffersoncountymetrogovernmentbal-

ancekentucky/PST045219 [perma.cc/99GP-R627].
155.
Due to the increase in the availability of video recordings, these anecdotes are increasingly conspicuous. See Harmon, supra note 36, at 364 (highlighting that "through videos, the
risks of violent confrontations during arrests are more visible than ever" and that "now is the
moment to reconsider arrests rather than continue to take this widespread form of state coercion
for granted.").

156.

Id.

157.

See Loosemore, supra note 154.
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Woolfolk." 158 On May 30, 2020, in Jacksonville, Florida, police pushed past
her white companion to arrest Black protester and Marine veteran, Coricia
Campbell, who was sitting on the sidewalk wearing a pink T-shirt that said, "I

CAN'T BREATHE JUSTICE 4 GEORGE." 159 Ms. Campbell was the only person arrested and brought to the precinct among the people protesting with
her. She shared a jail cell with eight other protesters-only one was white. 160
This information, along with what we know about law enforcement officers'
disparate treatment of Black people during traditional policing, poses the
question of whether this pattern of disparate traditional policing is replicated
during protest policing. To wade through this question, I briefly review current information about the disparate policing of Black people and then query
how information about the demographics of arrests in New York City during
the first few days of the George Floyd protests might provide insight into this
matter.

It is well-known that Black people are treated differently during routine
policing. This conclusion endures whether the police-civilian encounter occurs while walking down the street or driving a vehicle. In terms of traffic
stops, in a recent study, researchers examined 95 million traffic stops across
state and local jurisdictions from 2011 through 2018 and found that Black motorists were less likely to be stopped after dusk when police officers were unable to identify their race, thus suggesting racial bias in the initial decision to
effectuate a stop. 161 The same study found that once stopped, the vehicles of
Black and Latine drivers were twice as likely to be searched by police officers.16 2 Both of these racial minority groups "were searched on the basis of less
evidence than white drivers." 163 In the context of street encounters, Professor
Jeffrey Fagan examined data of police stops from 2004 through 2009 by the
NYPD under the department's infamous "stop and frisk" practice. 164 The research was compiled in the "Fagan Report," which the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) successfully used to invalidate the NYPD stop-and-frisk
practice as racially discriminatory and unconstitutional in Floyd v. City ofNew

158.

Id.

159.

Chan, supra note 151.

160.

Id.

161.
Emma Pierson et al.,A Large-ScaleAnalysis of Racial Disparitiesin Police Stops Across
the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736 (2020). Researchers did not evaluate how this
protective "veil-of-darkness" affected the stops of Latine motorists "because the ethnicity of Hispanic drivers is not always apparent, even during daylight hours." Id. at 737.
162.
Id. at 739. See supra note 5 for an explanation of why I use the term "Latine" instead
of "Latinx," "Latino," or "Latina."

163. Id. at 736.
164. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 6, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034) [hereinafter Fagan Report].
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York. 165 The Fagan Report found that Black and Latine individuals were significantly more likely to be stopped than white individuals. 166 NYPD officers

were also more likely to use force when engaging with Black and Latine suspects. 167 Once a police officer decided that the stopped individual had engaged
in criminal conduct, regardless of the nature of the crime, Black and Latine

individuals were more likely to be arrested. 168 Another study examined the
"race effect" on the decision to arrest and concluded, after conducting a metaanalysis of quantitative research on police practices and arrest decisions in the
United States from 1966 through 2004, that a minority suspect is 30 percent
more likely to be arrested than a white suspect, even when controlling for multiple other variables that might otherwise influence the likelihood of arrest. 169
By age twenty-three, 49 percent of Black men have been arrested compared to
38 percent of white men. 170
A recent study comparing youth surveys conducted in 1979 to those conducted in 1997 found alarming results suggesting that arrests may increasingly

be "decoupled" from criminal activity. 171 This "decoupling" is significantly

165.

959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., CTR. FOR

CONST. RTS., https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/floyd-et-al-v-city-new-york-et-al

[perma.cc/J599-ZJP2].
166.
Fagan Report, supra note 164, at 4. The statistics were particularly stark for the last
full year of the study-2009-showing that 87 percent of people stopped were Black and Latine.
CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP-AND-FRISK: FAGAN REPORT SUMMARY 2 (2010), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Fagan%20Report%20Summary%20Final.pdf [perma.cc/X753-

2X4S].
167.

Fagan Report, supra note 164, at 4. Another study examining data from approximately

44 million surveys of civilian contact with police nationwide in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011 found
that even though white people were more likely to have contact with police officers, Black people
were more than twice as likely to experience police force than white people. SHELLEY HYLAND,
LYNN LANGTON & ELIZABETH DAVIS, U.S. DEPT OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., POLICE USE OF
NONFATAL FORCE, 2002-11(2015), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/punf02 1l.pdf [perma.
cc/U8QY-FCRA]. SeegenerallyLynn Peeples, What the DataSayAboutPolice BrutalityandRacial
Bias-and Which Reforms Might Work, NATURE (May 26, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01846-z?utmsource=Nature+Briefing&utmcampaign=761bed091d-briefing-

dy-20200622&utm_medium=email&utmterm=0_c9dfd39373-761bed091d-44992633

[perma.cc

/5GF5-KB2H] (discussing fatal police force and police brutality more generally).The difference
between the incidence of police force between Latine and white people was more subtle. HYLAND
ET AL., supra.
168.

Fagan Report, supra note 164, at 4.

169.
Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect
Race on Officers'ArrestDecisions,49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 479-81, 498 (2011). The other variables
the studies controlled for included suspect's "demeanor, offense severity, presence of witnesses,
quantity of evidence at the scene, the occurrence or discovery of a new criminal offense during
the encounter, the suspect being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, prior record of the
suspect, or requests to arrest by victims." Id. at 498.
170.

Naomi F. Sugie & Kristin Turney, Beyond Incarceration:CriminalJustice Contactand

Mental Health, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 719, 721 (2017).
171.
Vesla M. Weaver, Andrew Papachristos & Michael Zanger-Tishler, The Great Decoupling: The DisconnectionBetween Criminal Offending and Experience of Arrest Across Two Cohorts, 5 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS., Feb. 2019, at 89, 91.
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more pronounced for Black men. 12 In the surveys, men were asked to report
whether they had been involved in criminal activity and whether they had

been arrested. 173 In the 1979 surveys, men who did not report engaging in
criminal activity also did not generally report being arrested.

174

The result was

the same whether the person was Black or white, with a slightly more likelihood of Latine men being arrested without having reported engaging in criminal conduct that year. 1 5 The situation worsened in 1997 for all men-

regardless of race, all reported arrests with greater frequency without reporting any criminal conduct. 176 Yet this alarming "increase [was] much more
pronounced among [B]lack[ ]" men than white, and, to a lesser degree, Latine
men. 177

While these findings are disconcerting overall, they also reveal that the
irrationality of the criminal system of policing and arrest exerts the heaviest
tax on Black individuals. Even arrests without convictions inflict serious harm
on individuals. Pertinent to this Article, an arrest effectively terminates an in-

dividual's protest activity, thereby curtailing their freedom of expression. 178
Aware that arrests are an effective strategy to halt protests, police officers may
employ arrests, not to stop criminal activity, but to control protesters, and
some (including this author) suggest "squelch dissent." 179 Police may employ
this strategy disproportionately on Black, Brown, and Latine activists, strip-

ping them even further than their white counterparts of the right to express
dissent. More generally, an arrest initiates a series of personal intrusions: arrestees are subject to searches of themselves and their belongings; their property is taken away during detention; they can be held in custody up to fortyeight hours before a judicial officer will be required to determine whether they
will be released; they are held in cramped conditions along with others (which
is particularly dangerous during the COVID-19 pandemic); and they are left
with an arrest record. 180 For many individuals arrested in the New York City

protests, these intrusions were further aggravated by arrest conditions and

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 89.
See id. at 95.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 90-91, 105 fig.4.
Id. at 91, 104.

178.

See discussion infra Section III.

Id. at 105 fig.4, 109.

179. E.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Why ChargesAgainst Protesters Are Being Dismissed by the
Thousands, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/19/us/protests-lawsuits-arrests.html [perma.cc/5QPU-55F6]; Tom Perkins, Most ChargesAgainst George Floyd Protesters Dropped, Analysis Shows, GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2021/apr/17/george-floyd-protesters-charges-citations-analysis [perma.cc/LG5ZGWLJ]; see also Loor, supra note 113, at 25-26 (discussing catch-and-release tactics during Ferguson protests).

180.
ing).

See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 364-65 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
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prolonged detention.181 In addition to these immediate consequences, arrests
exact collateral harm. An arrest record acts as a barrier to securing employ-

ment, public housing and sometimes private tenancy, public benefits, educational access, and various professional licenses. 182 Studies have also shown that
arrests are associated with poor mental and physical health.183 Furthermore,

these collateral consequences disparately affect Black populations. 184
Considering what we already know about disparate policing and specifi-

cally arrests of Black individuals, it is not only logical but critical to consider
whether this pattern is reproduced in protest policing and protest-related arrests. Here, I focus on available information about NYPD arrests in the first

181.
In New York City, more than 100 arrestees were held without arraignment for over
twenty-four hours in violation of New York law. See Press Release, Legal Aid Soc'y, Legal Aid
Files Emergency Lawsuit to Free 108 New Yorkers Illegally Detained Pre-Arraignment by
NYPD (June 2, 2020), https://legalaidnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/06-02-20-LASFiles-Emergency-Lawsuit-To-Free-108-New-Yorkers-Illegally-Detained-Pre-Arraignment-ByNYPD-.pdf [perma.cc/LG6N-54LE]. A journalist reported being held for two days after a disorderly conduct arrest. She described the deplorable conditions of her holding cells, including
vomit and cockroaches everywhere. Pereira & Hogan, infra note 224; see also Complaint at 4,

Sow v. City of New York, No. 21-cv-00533 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2021) ("Protesters were physically
restrained with flex-cuffs in such a manner that caused them unnecessary pain and suffering
and, in some cases, possible serious and long-term nerve damage. They were also subjected to
lengthy and unnecessary arrest processing that put them in dangerously close quarters, all at the

height of the global COVID-19 pandemic.").
182.
Benjamin D. Geffen, The CollateralConsequences of Acquittal:Employment Discrimination on the Basis ofArrests Without Convictions, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 81, 85-88
(2017) (analyzing case studies to find "employers' widespread use of non-convictions ... to reject job applicants or fire employees"); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON
COMMUNITIES 9 (2019) (hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REPORT) (finding barriers to "education, employment, professional licensing, housing, and receipt of public benefits" when having
a non-conviction criminal record); see also Tracy WP Sohoni, The Effect of Collateral Consequence Laws on State Rates of Returns to Prisons 6 (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Maryland) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) ("Many collateral consequences do not require that a person serve time in prison or jail, but can be activated for an arrest (such as restrictions on public housing)").
183.
See Sugie & Turney, supra note 170, at 719 (finding that "arrest is deleteriously associated with mental health, and arrest accounts for nearly half of the association between incarceration and poor mental health."); see also April D. Fernandes, How FarUp the River? Criminal
Justice Contactand Health Outcomes, 7 SOC. CURRENTS 29, 40 (2020) ("[A]ny level of exposure
to the criminal justice system that can either create stress-related illnesses or exacerbate existing
physical and mental health conditions.").
184.
See Sugie & Turney, supra note 170, at 723 ("Arrest, conviction, and incarceration are
concentrated among lower-status groups such as racial/ethnic minorities. Racial/ethnic minorities experience more social and economic disadvantages than do their counterparts, and this
accumulation of disadvantages, in combination with the primary stressors of criminal justice
contact, may be especially consequential for mental health."); CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REPORT,
supranote 182, at 3, 42, 67 (considering the disparate impact of collateral consequences on access
to employment, housing, education, and public benefits for Black and Latine men who are more
likely to have criminal records than their white and Asian counterparts); Geffen, supra note 182,
at 102 ("These phenomena combine to make a minor brush with the law a lasting impediment
to economic self-sufficiency, most strikingly for African Americans and low-income people.").
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week of the George Floyd protests. While I do not have sufficient information
or the tools to conclude that the NYPD disproportionately arrested Black activists, the arrest numbers at least suggest that this is a viable hypothesis. Although the actual racial breakdown of protesters during the first week of the
New York City demonstrations is unknown, the demographic breakdown of
the city can serve as a useful marker to consider the racial breakdown of protest-related arrests. The three largest racial and ethnic groups in New York
City are as follows: white at 41.3 percent, Latine at 28.9 percent, and Black at
23.8 percent. 185 In comparison to this marker, the arrest numbers in New York

City during the first six days of the protests-May 28 through June 4-show
Black people potentially being overrepresented in arrests to varying degrees,
with the starkest overrepresentation in the two days when the largest volume
of arrests is reported. 186 After those two days, the racial breakdown of arrests
shifts, and Black people appear as potentially underrepresented in arrests. 187

Table 1 below demonstrates the percentage and number of protest-related arrests for these three racial groups:
TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF PROTEST-RELATED ARRESTS IN NEW YORK CITY
ACROSS RACIAL GROUPS

Date188

Arrests

Black

white

Latine

May 28

75

27% or 20

47% or 35

17% or 13

May 29

218

30% or 66

56% or 121

12% or 26

May 30

321

34% or 110

53% or 169

10% or 32

May 31

325

65% or 212

18% or 60

13% or 42

June 1

643

62% or 190

19% or 57

17% or 52

June2

290

32% or94

51% or 149

12% or34

June3

244

19% or37

64% or123

11% or21

June4

278

18% or49

66% or 185

14% or38

Total arrests

2,394

32% or 778

38% or 899

11% or 258

185.
QuickFacts: New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork [perma.cc/U44C-FS85].
186.
N.Y.C. DEPT INVESTIGATION, INVESTIGATION INTO NYPD RESPONSE TO THE
GEORGE FLOYD PROTESTS 9 (2020) [hereinafter NYC DOI REPORT].

187.
188.

Id. at 16-22.
Id. at 8-22.
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Notably, compared to the documented percentage of Latine people in
New York City, Latine individuals appear underrepresented in arrests. While

it is possible that Latine people did not attend the protests or attended but
were not arrested, these arrest rates for Latine individuals might be based on
confusion related to how police officers reported an arrestee's race. Police officers chose between "white Hispanic" or "white," among other race classifications, when filling out the arrest paperwork. 189 Where a police officer listed
the race as "WH," it is unclear whether their intent was to categorize the arrestee as white or white Hispanic. 190 Therefore, some arrestees categorized as
white may be Latine individuals classified as "WH." 191 Thus, it is difficult to
read much from the low reported numbers of Latine arrests. It also sheds
doubt on the accuracy of the number of arrests of white people because it may
be overinclusive of white Hispanics.
Focusing on reported Black arrests, on the initial date of protest when police made few protest-related arrests, the percentage of Black arrestees is fairly
consistent with the relevant marker-the percentage of Black individuals in
the New York City population. Twenty-seven percent of arrestees are Black,
and approximately 24 percent of documented New York City residents are
Black. 192 In the days following, arrests of Black people comprise larger percentages of total protest-related arrests in New York City, with a sharp increase on the two days with the greatest number of arrests. 193 On those two
dates, Black people account for 65 percent and 62 percent of total protest-related arrests. 194 By contrast, on those same dates, white people account for a
relatively small percentage of arrests at 18 percent and 19 percent (that per-

centage is even lower if those arrests include Latine people categorized as
"WH").195
While the volume of arrests is important, so are the crimes for which individuals were arrested and were ultimately arraigned. From May 28 through

May 30, individuals were mostly arrested for the violation of disorderly conduct, misdemeanor unlawful assembly, or misdemeanor obstructing governmental administration. 196 On May 31 and June 1-the dates on which the

arrests of Black people constituted their largest percentage of total arrestsprotesters were arrested and ultimately arraigned for more serious property
offenses like felony burglary. 197 However, from June 2 through June 4, people
were mostly arrested for misdemeanor curfew violations. 198 In other words,

189.
190.
191.

See id. at 9 n.7.
Id. at 9 n.7.
Id.

192.

Id. at 9; QuickFacts:New York City, New York, supra note 185.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

NYC DOI REPORT, supranote 186, at 9-18
Id. at 14, 16.
Id.
Id. at 9.
See id. at 9-22.
Id. at 16-21.
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the NYPD made more serious protest-related arrests on the two dates when
Black people comprised the largest percentage of total arrests.
The next question is what happened to those arrested. Many of the arrests
occurred in Manhattan. 199 The Manhattan District Attorney's Office arraigned 484 people between May 28 and June 4 for protest-related cases. 2 00 No

one was arraigned for violating curfew, the crime for which most protesters
were arrested from June 2 through June 4. Only ten people were arraigned in
total for disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly, and obstructing governmental administration, the offenses that account for almost all arrests between
May 28 and May 30 and about half the arrests on June 1. Four hundred and
thirty-one of the total arraignments in Manhattan were for felonies. Of those

431 felonies, 372 were for burglary, with the most frequent category-accounting for 356 arraignments-being burglary in the third degree. 201 As a

reminder, police officers arrested people in large numbers for property offenses like burglary on May 31 and June 1, the two days when Black people
accounted for over 60 percent of arrests.202 At the end of those six days, 71

percent of the people arraigned for protest-related cases in Manhattan were
Black, and 6 percent were white. 203

All this being said, studies finding that police are more likely to stop, arrest, and use force against Black (and Brown) individuals during routine policing and the, albeit limited, information about protest-related arrests of

Black people in New York City hint that protest policing-like traditional policing-disparately harms Black people and that such harms result in Black

individuals enjoying an unequal (in)ability to express and practice dissent.
III.

APPLYING THE EXPRESSIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO PROTEST-RELATED
ARRESTS

Pursuant to the Expressive Fourth Amendment, courts should not treat
expressive protest conduct like nonexpressive conduct, including in the context of arrests. Evaluating police officers' conduct against protesters through

199.
N.Y. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT'Y GEN., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO DEMONSTRATIONS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF GEORGE
FLOYD 14, 16 (2020).
200.
Manhattan District Attorney, Summary Stats-Arraigned Protest and "Looting" Related Cases (June 2020) [hereinafter Summary Stats] (unpublished data set) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review) (compiling Manhattan District Attorney data on the number of reported
arrests in its jurisdiction from May 28, 2020 through June 4, 2020). I was provided this data by
Vice reporter, Carter Sherman, whose article, Black and Brown Protesters in New York Were
Jailed Longer and Punished More Harshly than White, Data Indicates, was very helpful to this
work. Carter Sherman, Neda Toloui-Semnani & Joe Hill, Black and Brown Protesters in New

York Were JailedLonger and PunishedMore Harshlythan White, Data Indicates, VICE (June 17,
2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/akz3z4/black-and-brown-protesters-in-newyork-were-jailed-longer-and-punished-more-harshly-than-white [perma.cc/T4GG-JKRT].
201.

Summary Stats, supra note 200.

202.

NYC DOI REPORT, supra note 186, at 13-16.

203.

Summary Stats, supra note 200.
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the framework of the Expressive Fourth Amendment better guards activists'
rights to express dissent and may particularly protect Black activists. In this
Article, I focus on the manner that courts should constrain police officers' arrest power by limiting the crimes for which they can make a warrantless ar-

rest. 204 Providing police officers with an unbounded power to execute
warrantless arrests when an individual is primarily engaged in expressive ac-

tivity-such as protest-is unreasonable in light of freedom of expression.
Here, I review the limitations of current Fourth Amendment challenges to all
arrests and then discuss how courts should evaluate a warrantless arrest when
an arrestee is engaged in expressive protest activity.
A.

Limits of CurrentFourth Amendment Challenges to Protest-Related
Arrests

The presiding understanding of the Fourth Amendment, which in the
context of arrests professes to guard bodily integrity-not freedom of expression-leaves protesters on the streets, and potentially disproportionately
Black protesters, largely unprotected against police officers' expansive arrest
power. The Fourth Amendment is intended to protect individuals from "unreasonable [governmental] searches and seizures." 2 05 However, scholars have

rightfully recognized that courts have rendered the prohibition on unreasonable police action toothless and instead have consistently characterized clearly
unfair, unacceptable, and even pretextual arrests as reasonable. 206 Further-

more, despite the Fourth Amendment's textual assertion that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, "207
courts' loose reading of this warrant language in the context of seizures of
criminal suspects has resulted in widespread warrantless arrests-whether for
felonies or misdemeanors. 201
Without a warrant requirement for arrests or any limitation based on the

seriousness or dangerousness of the crime, all an officer needs to arrest a criminal suspect is probable cause. This is already problematic in the non-protest

204.
The Expressive Fourth Amendment may have further implications on law enforcement's arrest power, including curtailing officers' ability to make pretextual arrests. However,
this argument is beyond the scope of this Article, and I will develop it in future work.
205.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

206.
See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 547, 591 (1999) (critiquing the amount of discretion afforded to officers under the courts'
broad interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness clause); David O. Markus,
Whren v. United States: A Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 91, 91-92 (1998) (analyzing "why the Court has undermined the Fourth Amendment" in
Whren v. United States's allowance for pretextual stops where objective probable cause could be
found).
207.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

208.
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 419 (1976); see also Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). This power arguably extends to infractions and violations as
well. See id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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context because it insufficiently protects bodily integrity,209 but the issue becomes even worse in the context of protesters because it also fails to protect
freedom of expression. Arrests take a particularly high toll on activists because
they not only impact their bodily integrity but also foreclose their expressive
rights by immediately thwarting their protest activity when police sweep them
up. Since protesters are treated no differently than non-protesters in terms of
warrantless arrests, a police officer only needs to allege probable cause for one
of an expansive, but nonexhaustive, list of crimes (like those discussed Part
II.A) to detain and arrest an activist on the streets and thus immediately curtail

their protest activity. 2 10 Even if there is no probable cause for the offense for
which a protester was actually arrested, as long as there is probable cause as to
any offense, their arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 211
Probable cause is a low bar and does little to curb police officer conduct.
The Court has established probable cause as "a fluid concept-turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts." 21 2 Generally, there
is probable cause when a court finds that a reasonable person would believe
that any crime had been committed or was being committed. 213 Any crime will

suffice since it need not ultimately be the crime for which the individual was
arrested. Even if the arrestee did not actually commit the crime, it does not
mean the arrest was without probable cause or unlawful. Indeed, "[t]he validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a

209.
See Paul Ohm, ProbablyProbableCause: The DiminishingImportance of Justification
Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1515 (2010) ("In increasingly common situations, whenever
the police have any suspicion at all about a piece of evidence, they almost always have probable
cause and can meet the highest level of justification."); see also Cynthia Lee, ProbableCause with
Teeth, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269 (2020); Harmon, supra note 36; Erica Goldberg, GettingBeyond Intuition in the ProbableCause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789 (2013).
210.
See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 ("If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.").

211. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004); see also Brown v. City of New York,
798 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2015) ("[T]he probable cause inquiry is not necessarily based upon the
offense actually invoked by the arresting officer but upon whether the facts known at the time of
the arrest objectively provided probable cause to arrest." (quoting Jaeglyv. Couch, 439 F.3d 149,

153 (2d Cir. 2006))); Mauler v. Arlotto, 777 F. App'x 59, 61 (4th Cir. 2019) ("The Supreme Court
has rejected any requirement that the offense for which the officer had probable cause be the
same as or closely related to the offense identified by the officer at the time of arrest.").

212.
213.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) ("The quantum of infor-

mation which constitutes probable cause [is] evidence which would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a felony has been committed ..... (quoting Carroll v. United States,

267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ("In dealing with
probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.").
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crime 214 since probable cause is "more than bare suspicion" but "less than
evidence which would justify condemnation." 21 5 Thus, police officers can engage in mass arrests during protests or even prosecutions that ultimately do
not result in convictions, and their arrests are not considered unconstitutional
as long as there is probable cause. Moreover, as will be shortly discussed, frequently, there is no judicial determination of probable cause for arrests since
most of these protest-related arrests are never arraigned, or cases are dismissed before such a determination is required.
Still, when assessing the existence of probable cause, courts will afford significant deference to the judgments of police officers on the scene. Courts are
cautioned against engaging in 20/20 hindsight when evaluating a police of-

ficer's decision to arrest (and to use force) because judges perceive the circumstances surrounding police work as "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. "216
This credo provides police with wide latitude in judging whether the totality
of the circumstances 217 justifies an arrest. Furthermore, courts consider the
reasonableness calculus an objective one that focuses on what a so-called reasonable police officer would have done. 2 11 Courts do not consider the actual

intent of the police officer as relevant to the constitutionality of their conduct. 219 Judges will disregard claims that a specific police officer is using arrest

214. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979); see also Wilson v Jean, 661 F. App'x
234, 235 (3d Cir. 2016) (where individual was only briefly detained and then released for disorderly conduct but never charged); Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 2008) (where the
individuals were held for two hours after arrest before being released, and "[t]hree months later,
the ... District Attorney announced that he had withdrawn the disorderly conduct charges because he doubted that the Commonwealth could successfully prosecute the matter.").

215. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339,
348 (1813)).
216. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct.
1715, 1725 (2019) ("Police officers conduct approximately 29,000 arrests every day-a dangerous task that requires making quick decisions in 'circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving.'" (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397)); Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436
(3d. Cir. 2000) ("While probable cause to arrest requires more than mere suspicion, the law recognizes that probable cause determinations have to be made 'on the spot' under pressure and do
'not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a prepon-

derance standard demands.' " (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975))).
217. See Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 393 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[W]e consider the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the challenged arrests."); Lorenzo v. City of Tampa,
259 F. App'x 239, 242 (11th Cir. 2007) ("In order for probable cause to exist, 'an arrest [must] be
objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.'" (citing Rankin v. Evans, 133

F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998)); Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959,
966 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances known
to the arresting officers (or within the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent
person would believe the suspect had committed a crime.").

218.
219.

See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[T]hese cases foreclose any

argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.").
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authority pretextually and with malicious intent-such as to suppress expression-if any reasonable police officer at the scene would have probable cause
for an arrest. 220 Thus, a court will not inquire into a police officer's intent for
making an arrest when evaluating probable cause. 221 I will leave for another

day the question of how the Expressive Fourth Amendment should impact a
police officer's ability to make a pretextual arrest. Here, I concentrate on how
it should constrain warrantless arrests for misdemeanors.
With an understanding of the few limitations that the presiding probable

cause doctrine places on a police officer's arrest power, the next question is
how the doctrine operates in practice in protest-related arrests. Counterintuitively, criminal cases are not good vehicles to evaluate this question. A judicial
officer will make a probable cause determination in a nominal number of pro-

test-related arrests. In misdemeanor cases, a court generally does not make a
probable cause determination until late in the pretrial stage. 222 Before a felony
case proceeds to trial, either a grand jury or a court will determine whether
there is probable cause to support a felony indictment; however, this probable
cause determination does not usually occur at the initial court appearance but
rather later in the life of the case. 223 Most protest-related arrests do not reach
the pretrial, trial, or much less the appellate stage. This is the trend generally
with protest-related arrests. 224 One year after George Floyd's murder, about

220.
See id. at 809, 819 ("[T]he District Court found that the officers had probable cause to
believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment."); see also Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1725 ("To ensure that officers may go
about their work without undue apprehension of being sued, we generally review their conduct
under objective standards of reasonableness.").

221.

See, e.g., Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that since

"[the officer's] motive would not affect the existence of probable cause," there was no need to
analyze whether officer acted out of "malice"); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir.
1988) ("Subjectively bad intentions on the part of the individual officer will not make a constitutional violation out of an otherwise reasonable seizure.").
222.
For instance, in New York, probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest is not determined until the pre-trial "Dunaway Hearing," which only occurs after the proper motions and
memoranda of law have been filed pursuant to CPL § 710.60. See Dunaway v. New York, 442

U.S. 200 (1979); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60 (McKinney 2019). Of course, speedier
determinations of probable cause are mandated where the government seeks pre-trial detention.

See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-26 (1975) (holding a "prompt" probable cause hearing
was required to continue detainment following a warrantless arrest); see also County of Riverside

v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (establishing forty-eight hours as the outer boundary of
the Gerstein promptness requirement).

223.

See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.10 (McKinney 2019) (outlining New York's in-

dictment process, which requires grand jury proceedings, unless waived, followed by a second
arraignment).
224.
Abu El-Haj, supra note 41, at 215; see also MacFarquhar, supra note 179 (stating that
"judges would toss out most cases [against Occupy Wallstreet protesters] or impose small sentences."); Sydney Pereira & Gwynne Hogan, NYPD's HistoricMass Arrest CampaignDuringGeorge
Floyd Protests Was Mostly for Low-Level Offenses, GOTHAMIST (June 10, 2020,8:05 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/nypds-historic-mass-arrest-campaign-during-george-floyd-protests-wasmostly-low-level-offenses [perma.cc/274X-WFGG] (93 percent of arrests related to Occupy Wall
Street protests were dismissed).
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90 percent of protest-related arrests had yet to be arraigned or were dismissed
prior to trial. 225

Consequently, federal civil rights actions are a better vehicle to evaluate
how the presiding Fourth Amendment understanding operates for protestrelated arrests. The federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983),
provides individuals a private right to sue government actors who violate their
constitutional rights. 226 In a § 1983 lawsuit, plaintiffs can recover damages and

obtain injunctive relief against future unconstitutional conduct. 227 Thus,
§ 1983 should act as a mechanism to ensure that government actors, including
police, do not overreach by trampling on individuals' constitutional rights.
Pursuant to § 1983, individuals can bring claims that police violated their
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
because of an unlawful detention or arrest. 228 This route is available whenever
an individual is arrested, whether in the context of a criminal investigation or

in the context of protests.
Yet, currently, § 1983 lawsuits have their own limitations. A plaintiff in a

§ 1983 lawsuit against a police officer cannot challenge the constitutionality of
a statute or rule via the Fourth Amendment. The unlawfulness of a rule may
be a defense in a criminal case, but in a § 1983 lawsuit, that rule can be challenged via the First Amendment, and, even when it violates the First Amend-

ment, it does not establish a Fourth Amendment claim unless the defendant
officer should have known the rule was invalid.229 Again, a showing of probable cause as to any crime-not necessarily the one for which a protester is arrested-is a complete defense to a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. 2 0

225.

Perkins, supra note 179.

226.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

227.

See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (authorizing injunctive suits); Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (recognizing damages).
228. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (affirming the dismissal of an unlawful
arrest challenge brought under § 1983 that should have been brought under the Fourth Amendment rather than Fifth Amendment); accord Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017); see

also Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A claim
for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided
the arrest was without probable cause or other justification."); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367,
370 (7th Cir. 1968). Protesters can also bring Fourth Amendment claims for other reasons, including claims of excessive force. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11; Loor, supra note 85,

at 283.
229.

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Reza v.

Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 2015) (" '[T]he existence of a statute or ordinance authorizing
a particular conduct is a factor which militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable official
would find the conduct constitutional.'" (quoting Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200,

1209 (9th Cir. 1994))).
230. See Lorenzo v. City of Tampa, 259 F. App'x 239, 241 (11th Cir. 2007) (" '[P]robable
cause constitutes an absolute bar to ...

§ 1983 claims alleging false arrest.' " (quoting Rankin v.

Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998))); see also Meyers v. City of New York, 812 F. App'x
11, 14 (2d Cir. 2020) ("Probable cause is a complete defense to a constitutional claim of false

arrest"); Fenn v. City of Truth or Consequences, 983 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2020); Swagler
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It is therefore unsurprising that § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims by

protesters fare poorly. By this, I do not mean to suggest that individuals bringing § 1983 claims against police because of their treatment during a criminal

investigation, unrelated to protest activity, fare better. 231 However, I zone in
on § 1983 claims by protesters because the Expressive Fourth Amendment

doctrine applies specifically to people engaged in expressive activity, as opposed to suspects police encounter during regular policing. 23 2 Reviewing all
sixty-two circuit cases since § 1983's enactment where individuals engaged in
expressive protest activity brought unlawful detention or arrest claims against
law enforcement, only five cases 23 survived dismissal and made it to trial. An

additional ten cases 2 4 were settled before trial, with some plaintiffs receiving

v. Neighoff, 398 F. App'x 872, 881 (4th Cir. 2010); Lyons v. City of Seattle, 214 F. App'x 655, 656
n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Currier v. Baldridge, 914 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1990).
231. See Julianne N. Zilahy, Onefor All, or All for One: The CircuitSplit on the Probable
Cause Element of a § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claim, 43 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 383, 413-14
(2020) (arguing that the split circuit probable cause requirement for false arrest § 1983 claims
"mutates [the doctrine] from a police safety measure into a shield of unchecked power, allowing
officers' vengeance, racism, bias, or even laziness free to infringe upon an arrestee's liberty,"
which "create[s] an impossibly high bar for plaintiffs to surpass."); Diana Hassel, Excessive Rea-

sonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 117 (2009) ("When these two [§ 1983 and qualified immunity]
doctrines converge, an almost impenetrable barrier to liability results."); Jeremy R. Lacks, Note,
The Lone American Dictatorship:How CourtDoctrineand PoliceCulture Limit JudicialOversight
of the Police Use of DeadlyForce, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 391, 393 (2008) (arguing that "the
federal judiciary, as a consequence of a unique combination of the doctrinal features of § 1983
suits and the characteristics of contemporary police culture, has substantially relinquished its
ability to oversee the police ..... ).
232.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11.

233. See Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (affirming jury finding in
favor of protesters); but see Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 394-95 (2nd Cir. 2013)
(affirming directed verdict on qualified immunity grounds to officer); Fogarty v. Gallegos, No.
05-cv-00026 (D.N.M. 2009) (jury finding in favor of defendant officers upon remand after denial

of summary judgment to officers); Mackinney v. Nielsen, 152 F.3d 927(9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (affirming bench verdict in favor of defendants); Posr v. Doherty, No.

87-cv-06575 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1991) (settled for $75,000 plus attorney's fees after appellate
court ordered malicious prosecution claim to be retried).

234.

See Toole v. City of Atlanta, No. 16-cv-02909 (N.D. Ga. Jul. 2, 2020) ("Plaintiff's claim

has been compromised and settled in full between the parties"); Mauler v. Arlotto, No. 18-cv-

01445 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2019) (settlement order); Davidson v. City of Stafford, No. 14-CV-03596
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2018) (notice of settlement); Douglas v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-08124
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2018) (settlement order for $35,000.00 plus $110,000.00 in attorney's fees);
Swagler v. Harford County, No. 08-cv-02289 (D. Md. Apr. 23, 2012) ("Each side shall bear their
own costs"); Beal v. City of Chicago, No. 04-cv-02039, 2012 WL 9503972 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2012)
(consolidating plaintiffs' claims to settle for $1,135,000.00); Carr v. District of Columbia, No. 06-

cv-00098 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2011) (notice of dismissal); Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, No. 06cv-04953, 2010 WL 3591489 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2010) (settlement order for $165,000); Hankin
v. City of Seattle, No. 00-cv-01672 (W.D. Wash. Oct 26, 2007) (order granting final approval of
class settlement); Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 98-cv-01075 (N.D. Cal. Nov.

27, 2001) (stipulation and order). In addition, Harcz v. Boucher, No. 17-cv-00112 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 3, 2017) is awaiting a second appeal after the district court granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion in part, and after the Sixth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to proceed past the
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modest compensation. In the vast majority of cases, plaintiffs lost at the motion to dismiss or the motion for summary judgment phase, and they received
nothing. Among these, courts found that qualified immunity insulated officers from suit in two cases at the motion to dismiss stage 2 15 and in an additional
twenty-five cases at summary judgment. 2 6 Moreover, courts ruled that police
officers had probable cause to arrest activists in seven cases at the motion to
dismiss phase 2 7 and in nine cases at summary judgment. 238 These overwhelming losses for plaintiffs suggest that Fourth Amendment precedent and qualified immunity principles coalesce to provide police extreme discretion to
effectuate warrantless arrests-often for nonviolent and minimally offensive

crimes as described in Part I. Although a discussion of qualified immunity is
beyond the scope of this Article, in the next section, I discuss how a clearer
understanding of the protections of the Expressive Fourth Amendment
should affect courts' analysis of protest-related warrantless arrests.

motion to dismiss stage in the first appeal. See Harcz v. Boucher, 763 F. App'x 536, 545 (6th Cir.

2019).
235. See Marcavage v. Nat'l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 860 (3rd Cir. 2012); Battiste v. Sheriff
of Broward Cnty., 261 F. App'x 199, 203 (11th Cir. 2008).
236. See Skovgard v. Pedro, 448 F. App'x 538, 546 (6th Cir. 2011); Norse v. City of Santa
Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2010); Rosebrock v. Perez, 829 F. App'x 212, 216 (9th Cir.
2020); Thames v. City of Westland, 796 F. App'x 251, 263 (6th Cir. 2019); Berg v. Kelly, 897 F.3d
99, 112 (2d Cir. 2018); Wiles v. City of New York, 724 F. App'x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2018); TaylorWilliams v. Rembert, 712 F. App'x. 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2017); White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064,
1076 (8th Cir. 2017); Weed v. Jenkins, 873 F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2017); Panagacos v. Towery,
692 F. App'x 330, 333 (9th Cir. 2017); Wilson v. Jean, 661 F. App'x. 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2016);
Brown v. City of New York, 798 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2015); Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237,
251 (7th Cir. 2012); Joyce v. Crowder, 480 F. App'x 954, 960 (11th Cir. 2012); Bernini v. City of
St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012); Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 825-26
(9th Cir. 2013); Moran v. Cameron, 362 F. App'x 88, 94 (11th Cir. 2010); Cross v. Mokwa, 547
F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2008); Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 2008); Bennett v.
Schroeder, 99 F. App'x 707, 715 (6th Cir. 2004); Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police Dep't, 375 F.3d 785,
792 (8th Cir. 2004); Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 2000); Picray v. Sealock, 138
F.3d 767,772 (9th Cir. 1998); Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289,297 (8th Cir. 1996); Johnston
v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1994).
237. See Meyers v. City of New York, 812 F. App'x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2020); Garcia v. Bloomberg, 662 F. App'x 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2016); Dukore v. District of Columbia, 799 F.3d 1137, 1142
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ryan v. County of
DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1995); Currier v. Baldridge, 914 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir.
1990); Caravalho v. City of New York, 732 F. App'x 18, 22 (2d Cir. 2018).
238. See Fenn v. City of Truth or Consequences, 983 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2020);
Asprey v. N. Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 823 F. App'x 627,634 (10th Cir. 2020); Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 482 (6th Cir. 2019); Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 2015);
Blomquist v. Town of Marana, 501 F. App'x 657, 659 (9th Cir. 2012); Lorenzo v. City of Tampa,
259 F. App'x 239, 242 (11th Cir. 2007); Lyons v. City of Seattle, 214 F. App'x 655, 657 (9th Cir.
2006); Mims v. City of Eugene, 145 F. App'x 194, 196 (9th Cir. 2005); Mangieri v. Clifton, 29
F.3d 1012, 1018 (5th Cir. 1994). One case did not find probable cause to arrest at the summary
judgment stage, but litigation is still ongoing. See Quraishi v. St. Charles County, 986 F.3d 831,
836 (8th Cir. 2021). Another older case did not find probable cause to arrest at the summary
judgment stage, but there is no available record of subsequent district court proceedings. See

Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2008).
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Expressive FourthAmendment Challenges to Protest-RelatedArrests

Courts' reasonableness analysis of protest-related arrests fails to protect
freedom of expression because it treats expressive protest conduct like ordinary conduct. This is contrary to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
which was designed to protect freedom of expression and bodily integrity. The
presiding Fourth Amendment analysis provides too much deference to police
when freedom of expression is on the line and disregards how an individual's
participation in expressive protest activity should change the reasonableness
calculus. Perhaps if existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more effectively safeguarded bodily integrity, this intervention would not be necessary
to protect activists' expressive freedoms. However, such is not the existing
state of affairs. Thus, as I previously argued in the context of protesters' claims
of police excessive force, 239 courts should evaluate whether an arresting police
officer's conduct is reasonable in light of freedom of expression. While reasonableness in light of freedom of expression is still a question of balancing
the totality of the circumstances, 24 0 an individual's engagement in expressive

activity should change the balance. Pursuant to this rebalancing, courts should
rule that warrantless arrests for nonviolent misdemeanors241 are unreasona-

ble. In the George Floyd protests, activists were overwhelmingly arrested for
nonviolent misdemeanors. 242 The Expressive Fourth Amendment balance is
off when courts allow police to engage in warrantless arrests of peaceful protesters for minor nonviolent crimes.
The Supreme Court dealt with the question of the constitutionality of
warrantless arrests of criminal suspects for misdemeanors punishable only via
fine in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista. 23 In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the

Court concluded, in the context of a misdemeanor traffic offense, that "[i]f an
officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." 244 The Atwater majority recognized
that at common law, the practice regarding warrantless misdemeanor arrests
was not uniform. 2 4 Nevertheless, the Court arrived at its holding by relying
on the presiding state practice allowing for warrantless misdemeanor arrests
and its interpretation that Supreme Court precedent-primarily Whren v.

239.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11.

240. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 23031 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
241.
ors).

See sources cited supra note 44 (discussing the definition of nonviolent misdemean-

242.
See supra Section II.B (discussing common protest-related arrests, most of which lack
a requirement of violence).

243.

532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).

244.
Id.; see also Harmon, supra note 36, at 323 ("Atwater v. City of Lago Vista permits
custodial arrests for fine-only offenses, for which public safety arguments for custody are at their
weakest.").

245.

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 327-33.

1622

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:1581

United States-mandated a categorical and easily administrable approach to

Fourth Amendment questions instead of a case-by-case analysis. 24 6 Regarding
the state practices, the Court took a no harm, no foul approach,highlighting
that at oral argument, Atwater's attorney could only present one other in-

stance, besides the instant scenario, of "foolish, warrantless misdemeanors arrests." 247 This served as proof for the Atwater majority that "surely the country
is not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense
arrests." 2 4 1 Atwater was decided in 2001. Recent scholarship suggests that,
contrary to the majority's contention, we might in fact be experiencing epidemic misdemeanor arrests with devastating consequences.249 Nevertheless,
Atwater established that a police officer could arrest an individual-with no
warrant-for a misdemeanor crime where the accused can only receive a fine
and not jail time. 250

The majority's decision in Atwater was close and thus not uncontroverted
among the Justices. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor penned a powerful dissent,
which was joined by Justices John Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer. 251 Justice O'Connor also concluded that the common law history was
inconclusive, but thereafter her agreement with the majority ended. 2 2 Justice
O'Connor asserted that since the status of the common law regarding warrantless arrests for misdemeanors was unclear, the next appropriate step was

246.
See id. at 352-53 ("[S]ignificantly, under current doctrine the preference for categorical treatment of Fourth Amendment claims gives way to individualized review when a defendant makes a colorable argument that an arrest, with or without a warrant, was 'conducted in an
extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [his] privacy or even physical interests.' "(quoting

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)). In Whren, the Court held that the subjective
intent of officer's is of no consequence so long as they have probable cause to stop and arrest.
517 U.S. 806. See also Harmon, supra note 36, at 323 ("Whren v. United States allows pretextual
arrests in which the government may have no legitimate interest in arresting the suspect.").

247.
248.

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353.
Id.

249.
See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 43-44 fig.1.4 (2018) (documenting the
rise of misdemeanor arrests under broken windows policing in New York from approximately
160,000 summons issued in 1993 to over 600,000 in 2005); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson,
The Scale of MisdemeanorJustice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 737 (2018) ("[W]e estimate that there are
13.2 million misdemeanor cases filed in the United States each year").
250.

See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325, 369 (allowing arrest where the maximum penalty is a

$25-$50 fine); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[Atwater] recognized no constitutional limitation on arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor offense.");

Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding an arrest where
penalty was "a fine plus the costs of prosecution"); see also Vargas v. City of New York, 56
N.Y.S.3d 438, 440 (2017) (upholding a warrantless arrest where the defendant was sentenced to
four days of community service and a $120 surcharge). While arresting for a crime for which
there is no jail penalty may violate state law-like plaintiffs alleged in Black Lives MatterL.A. v.
City of Los Angeles-it does not violate the U.S. Constitution. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
251.

Her dissent was joined by three other justices to make this a narrow 5-4 case.

252.

See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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for the Court to wrestle with the Fourth Amendment question by weighing
the government's interest against the intrusion upon the individual. 23 Based
on this balancing, she classified the warrantless arrest for a fine-only traffic

offense as constitutionally unreasonable and "def[ying] any sense of proportionality," finding that the government interest in enforcing a minor traffic

law is insufficient to satisfy the intrusion of a full custodial arrest, regardless
of the existence of probable cause. 25 4 She distinguished Atwater from Whren

by highlighting the more serious intrusion and harm of an arrest as opposed
to a simple traffic stop. 25 5 Justice O'Connor remarked that "[b]ecause a full
custodial arrest is such a severe intrusion on an individual's liberty, its reasonableness hinges on the 'degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' "256 She further asserted that "[g]iving police
officers constitutional carte blanche to effect an arrest whenever there is probable cause to believe a . .. misdemeanor has been committed is irreconcilable
with the Fourth Amendment's command that seizures be reasonable." 25 7
I agree with Justice O'Connor's dissent. Atwater was wrongfully decided.
The Atwater rule is flawed for the reasons expressed by the dissent and has
been rightfully critiqued.2518 Allowing police to execute warrantless custodial
arrests for all misdemeanors, including those punishable only via fine, fails to
safeguard bodily integrity as required by the Fourth Amendment. What's
more, in the context of protests, an arrest intrudes not only on an individual's
liberty and privacy rights but vitally also on their expressive rights. Thus, when
an arrest would affect bodily integrity and expressive freedoms, such as when
the target is a protester, the Court must wrestle with the Fourth Amendment
question, recalibrating the calculus, and ask whether a warrantless misdemeanor custodial arrest is reasonable in light of freedom of expression.
Providing police constitutional carte blanche to execute warrantless arrests for
all types of misdemeanors is unacceptable when freedom of expression is at
stake. As in cases involving searches for papers, courts should review protestrelated arrests with scrupulous exactitude and rein in police discretion be-

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 365 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
Id. at 365-66.

258.

See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O'Connor's

Dissent in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 79 MIss. L. J. 115, 117 (2009) ("Justice O'Connor's Atwater dissent, wise when offered almost a decade ago, and prescient in light of subsequent events,
is deserving of a place in the pantheon of the Court's great Fourth Amendment dissents"); Jason
A. Katz, Note, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: Buckle-Up or Get Locked-Up: WarrantlessArrests
for Fine-Only Misdemeanors Under the Fourth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 491 (2003); Lisa
Ruddy, Note, From Seat Belts to Handcuffs: May Police Arrestfor Minor Traffic Violations?, 10

AM. U. J. GENDER

SOC. POLY &L.

479 (2002).
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cause, in their zeal to enforce the law, officers may inadvertently (or purposefully) arrest protesters engaged in lawful protest activity. 2 9 Although Atwater's counsel did not make a sufficient case to satisfy the majority that there
was "an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests" worth addressing, 260
the voluminous protest-related arrests from 2020 do amount to an epidemic
that courts should not ignore.
Courts should recognize that the interests change in the reasonableness
calculus when the policed person is engaged in expressive protest activity.
First, both the individual and public interest in freedom of expression must
affect the reasonableness calculus. 261 While an individual protester has their
own interest in freedom of expression, which will be discussed shortly, there
is also a "public interest in ensuring the broad exercise of First Amendment
freedoms [that] must enter the calculus." 262 This public interest in expressive
freedom exists because "the consequences of illegal use of the power of arrest"
extend beyond just the arrestee to both those who will be intimidated and
thereby deterred from engaging in expressive protest activity and to those
"who would [have] otherwise receive[d] such expression. "26 Valuing freedom
of expression in this reasonableness calculus reaffirms its centrality within our
democratic society and system of government. 264 This is distinct from Atwater, where there was no analogous public interest in the motorist's operation
of her motor vehicle.
On the government's side of the reasonableness equation, public safety
concerns are lessened in the context of protests versus a criminal investigation. Courts give deference to officers' judgments because they view criminal
police work as dangerous; 265 however, that concern is not present in the same
manner when officers engage in the policing of protests as opposed to a criminal investigation. 266 Protests generally do not present the same dangers to police and the public as those courts attribute to criminal policing. 267

259.
See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11, at Section III.A.2. On the issue of the purposeful use of arrest power to squelch dissent, I plan to grapple with how the Expressive Fourth
Amendment applies to pretextual arrests in future work.
260.

See supra notes 247-249-and accompanying discussion.

261.
262.
263.
264.

See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 475-476 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 476.
See id.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Brandeis, J., concurring))

("Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty; and
that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government." (quoting Whitney v.

California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)).
265.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (recognizing circumstances of police
encounter as "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving"); see also sources cited supra note 216.
266.
See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11, at Section III.B (discussing how courts
should view police engagement with protesters).
267.
In fact, the overwhelming majority of 2020 racial justice protesters were found to be
peaceful. Erica Chenoweth & Jeremy Pressman, This Summer's Black Lives MatterProtesters Were
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Considering this reduced public safety concern, the next question is whether
some circumstance or factor suggests a safety concern. Nonviolent misdemeanors do not present such safety concerns. Thus, if a police officer observes
a protester engaged in a nonviolent misdemeanor, without more, 26 1 that

should not raise a public safety concern sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
considering the countervailing public interest in freedom of expression and,
as will be discussed, a protester's augmented interest. The government maintains an interest in enforcing the law during protests. However, such interest
can be satisfied with the issuance of a citation or summons. 269
On the individual's side of the reasonableness calculus, the policed person's interest extends beyond bodily integrity to their freedom of expression.
Here, courts must positively weigh an individual's expressive political activity.27 0 This expressive activity deserves more protection than the realm of nonexpressive activities, and courts should not equate them in their balancing. In
other words, an individual has an interest in bodily integrity pursuant to the

Fourth Amendment, which is implicated whenever a government actor detains or arrests them. However, when an individual participates in expressive

protest activity, their interest is not only based on their right to bodily integrity
but is augmented by their right to freedom of expression. Thus, the protester's
implicated interest against government intrusion is greater than the interests

of an individual not engaged in expressive activity. This augmented individual
interest and concomitant public interest in protected expression-along with
reduced officer and public safety concerns-mitigate against the latitude provided to police by a broad power to execute warrantless arrests for any crime.
When a police officer witnesses an activist engaging in conduct that amounts
to a nonviolent misdemeanor, the officer should detain that individual only
for the time reasonably necessary to gather name and contact information and
provide them with a summons to appear in court at a later date. Thereafter,

the activist should be allowed to continue protesting.
The government interest in effectuating a warrantless arrest may arguably

change when the alleged crime is either a felony or even when it is a misdemeanor that includes violence (such as battery or assault) or an imminent

Overwhelmingly Peaceful, Our ResearchFinds, WASH. POST (Oct 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/ 16/this-summers-black-lives-matter-protesters-were-overwhelming-peaceful-our-research-finds [perma.cc/F3VA-57MC].
268.
The "more" that would justify a warrantless arrest may be circumstances, demonstrated by the police officer, that suggest an actual and viable threat of imminent bodily harm or
some threshold degree of property damage. However, I expect to delve into this question further
in future research.
269.
See Harmon, supra note 36, at 337, 339-40 (arguing that in most situations, law enforcement should issue citations and summons as most people would likely still come to court
in light of advancing technology to hold them accountable).
270.

See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 11, at Section III.B.
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threat of such violence. Felonies are considered more serious than misdemeanors and therefore carry harsher penalties, 27 1 and courts also consider felons to be more dangerous than misdemeanants. 272 Therefore, all things being
equal and neutral, the government may have a more serious interest in provid-

ing police the authority to arrest, without a warrant, protesters accused of
committing felonies. However, this distinction between felony and misdemeanor may be more fiction than fact if the protesters' race impacts what

crime a police officer chooses to charge. As a reminder, the two days when
Black people accounted for over 60 percent of protest-related arrests in New
York City were the days when NYPD arrested protesters for felony property
offenses instead of misdemeanor offenses. 273 Moreover, after a stop, police are
more likely to arrest Black individuals than white individuals. 274 To be blunt,
if police officers know they can only arrest-without warrants-activists for
felonies and violent misdemeanors, courts should be wary that police may be
more likely to arrest Black activists than white activists for these more serious
and readily arrestable offenses.
CONCLUSION
"I love America more than any other country in the world, and, exactlyfor this
reason, I insist on the right to criticize herperpetually."
2 75
-James Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son

271.
See What Happens in a Felony Case, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE N.D. OF ILL. (July 24,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/programs/vwa-felony [perma.cc/4LM4-UQJ7] ("Any
offense punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year is called a felony. Felonies
are the most serious crimes. The prosecutors and the courts handle felony cases differently from
misdemeanor cases (cases that have shorter possible sentences).").
272.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925) ("The reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at common law was promptly to suppress breaches of the peace,
while the reason for arrest without warrant on a reliable report of a felony was because the public
safety and the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses required that such
arrests should be made at once without warrant.") (internal citation omitted); see also Lange v.
California, 141 S. Ct. 2011 (2021) (distinguishing misdemeanors from felonies for purposes of
warrantless home entry under hot pursuit doctrine as "[s]tates tend to apply the misdemeanor
label to less violent and less dangerous crimes."); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 752 (1984)
("[C]ourts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies,
independent of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. .. . But of those courts
addressing the issue, most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for nonfelonious
crimes.") (citations omitted); but see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2, 14 (1985) (arguing that
"[m]any crimes classified as misdemeanors, or nonexistent, at common law are now felonies"
and that "[t]hese changes have .... made the assumption that a 'felon' is more dangerous than
a misdemeanant untenable," especially when considering that "numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies.").
273.

See supra notes 172-174.

274.

See supra notes 164-168 (discussing the Fagan Report).

275.

James Baldwin, NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 9 (2012) (emphasis added).
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The Expressive Fourth Amendment demands that when an individual is

engaged in expressive political conduct such as protest, courts review a governmental intrusion with scrupulous exactitude and evaluate whether the intrusion is reasonable in light of freedom of expression. Exacting judicial
review is necessary to protect activists' expressive rights from capricious police action. The deluge of mass arrests during the 2020 racial justice protests
is evidence of caprice, and the potential targeting of Black protesters retells a
story of race-based policing that is unfortunately all too familiar. Courts must
rein in arrest authority meaning that, at the very least, officers should not have

the power to effectuate a custodial arrest without a warrant when a protester's
alleged conduct amounts to a nonviolent misdemeanor. It is an open question
where the line should lie otherwise for warrantless arrests during protests, but
the move must be toward contraction considering freedom of expression is at
stake.

